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Abstract
The Internet has evolved from a small research network towards a large globally in-
terconnected network. The deregulation of the Internet attracted commercial entities
to provide various network and application services for profit. While Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) offer network connectivity services, Content Service Providers (CSPs)
offer online contents and application services. Further, the ISPs that provide transit ser-
vices to other ISPs and CSPs are known as transit ISPs. The ISPs that provide Internet
connections to end users are known as access ISPs. Though without a central regulatory
body for governing, the Internet is growing through complex economic cooperation be-
tween service providers that also compete with each other for revenues. Currently, CSPs
derive high revenues from online advertising that increase with content popularity. On
other hand, ISPs face low transit revenues, caused by persistent declines in per-unit traffic
prices, and rising network costs fueled by increasing traffic volumes.
In this thesis, we analyze various approaches by ISPs for sustaining their network in-
frastructures by earning extra revenues. First, we study the economics of traffic attraction
by ISPs to boost transit revenues. This study demonstrates that traffic attraction and
reaction to it redistribute traffic on links between Autonomous Systems (ASes) and create
camps of winning, losing and neutral ASes with respect to changes in transit payments.
Despite various countermeasures by losing ASes, the traffic attraction remains effective
unless ASes from the winning camp cooperate with the losing ASes. While our study
shows that traffic attraction has a solid potential to increase revenues for transit ISPs,
this source of revenues might have negative reputation and legal consequences for the
ISPs. Next, we look at hosting as an alternative source of revenues and examine hosting
of online contents by transit ISPs. Using real Internet-scale measurements, this work
reports a pervasive trend of content hosting throughout the transit hierarchy, validating
the hosting as a prominent source of revenues for transit ISPs. In our final work, we con-
sider a model where access ISPs derive extra revenues from online advertisements (ads).
Our analysis demonstrates that the ad-based revenue model opens a significant revenue
potential for access ISPs, suggesting its economic viability.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet began with the interconnections of few computers as part of a research
project by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency). It rapidly evolved from
being a small research network towards a large globally distributed network of millions of
computers. With the deregulation of the Internet, many commercial entities entered the
field to provide various services for profit. The entities that provide network infrastruc-
ture and connectivity services are called Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The entities
that provide online contents and application services are referred to as Content Service
Providers (CSPs). An ISP manages its network by segmenting the network into one or
more Autonomous Systems (ASes) – collection of network routers and switches managed
under a common administrative policy. From an economic perspective, Internet infras-
tructure services can be classified into 3 categories: transit, hosting, and access. While
access ISPs supply Internet connections for residential and enterprise users, hosting ISPs
serve CSPs by providing computing, storage and networking resources for hosting online
contents on the Internet. Transit ISPs offer connectivity to the global Internet and op-
erate geographically distributed communication infrastructures. During the early stage,
the Internet topology evolved to form a hierarchical structure, wherein large transit ISPs,
known as tier-1 providers, interconnected with each other to form the core of the Inter-
net. Surrounding the core, the intermediate layer of the Internet topology consisted of
medium and small transit ISPs, known as tier-2 and tier-3 providers respectively. On the
periphery of the intermediate layer, CSPs, access, and hosting ISPs formed the outer edge
of the Internet.
The creation and maintenance of the ISP network infrastructures involve substantial
costs. It is common for the ISPs to recover the costs by charging customers for connec-
tivity services. Access ISPs charge monthly subscription fees to end users. Hosting ISPs
charge CSPs for the provided computing, storage and networking resources. CSPs rely
primarily on online advertisements (ads), besides selling goods online and offering paid
online services. For traffic delivery, access, and hosting providers pay transit providers
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for traffic delivery across the Internet.
As alluded, the Internet is a network of thousands of interconnected ISPs operated by
profit-driven business entities. Each ISP meticulously engineers its own physical network
to enable efficient paths for its internal traffic flows. The interconnections between ISPs
are mainly driven by economic interests and business negotiations. To establish inter-ISP
business relations, an ISP negotiates bilateral contracts with its neighbors based on many
factors, such as potential traffic demand. Therefore from an economic point of view, the
Internet is a loosely connected network of inter-ISP business relations established on a
basis of complex economic policies.
1.1 Motivation
Currently, the Internet does not have a central governing body to directly regulate
all the service providers across the globe. Yet, the Internet is growing through complex
economic cooperation between service providers that also compete with each other for
revenues. In the current Internet economy, the CSPs’ revenue growth is 2 times higher
than the ISPs’ revenue growth [1]. The CSPs’ economic growth is mainly boosted by online
ad revenues which grow with the online content consumption by end users. Therefore, the
CSPs have incentives to create advanced innovative online contents, which often consume
substantial network capacity, e.g., online 3D video streaming.
On the other hand, transit ISPs’ revenues mainly depend on the traffic volume on their
links with their transit customers. While access ISPs’ revenues depend on fixed monthly
subscription fees paid by end users, their network costs consisting of transit payments
and capital expenses are traffic-dependent. Thus a larger traffic volume provides higher
incentives to transit ISPs in the form of transit revenues and lower incentives to access
ISPs due to rising network costs. Currently, ISPs generate a lower Return on Investment
(RoI) due to falling per-unit traffic prices in the transit sector, and rising network costs
in the access sector due to increasing traffic volume in the access ISPs’ networks [1, 2].
Besides, the capital and operational expenditures (CapEx and OpEx respectively) of ISPs
are higher compared to the expenditures of CSPs [3].
In the Internet core, persistent declines in the transit traffic prices [2] as well as
extensive peering and content caching at the Internet edge [4–7] have recently put transit
businesses under significant financial pressure [8]. To boost revenues, transit providers
experiment with new economic models, such as paid peering [9], remote peering [10,
11], group purchase of transit [12, 13] and partial transit [14], to diversify the offered
connectivity products. Further, there exists anecdotal evidence that few transit providers
use unorthodox routing techniques to attract extra traffic of transit customers [15, 16].
Hence, this thesis begins by studying incentives for transit ISPs to boost their revenues
via traffic attraction.
1.2. Contributions 3
As a consequence of the financial challenges in Internet transit, transit providers have
branched out into providing hosting services to CSPs. To achieve higher performance
for the bandwidth-intensive online contents, CSPs approach transit ISPs to leverage the
global transit infrastructure for caching their online contents geographically closer to end
users. Thus, the content hosting by transit ISPs have transformed the content traffic
sources from the earlier remote CSP-originated to distributed sources of content traffic
across the Internet transit hierarchy. Our thesis explores this paradigm shift in the content
hosting. This shift necessitates modeling of the content traffic matrix to also consider
traffic sources in transit networks, which were earlier viewed as mere forwarders of end-
to-end traffic.
Next, because of the increasing traffic originated by CSPs and their caches on transit
networks, access ISPs face rising network costs due to frequent backbone capacity up-
grades to accommodate the growing traffic. As access ISPs earn revenues in the form of
fixed subscription fees, their profit margins decrease due to rising network costs. Recently,
access ISPs demand financial payments from CSPs for allocating more capacity for the
bandwidth-intensive content traffic or subtly degrade the content delivery performance at
the access backbone [17]. Such tussles have led to many net-neutrality wars, where CSPs
accuse access ISPs of traffic discrimination by deliberate performance degradation [18–20].
On the other hand, access ISPs are also in disputes with their transit providers regarding
violations of prior-agreed traffic ratios [21]. Thus, in this thesis, we propose and analyze
how access ISPs can use online ads as an alternative revenue source.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we study alternative revenue sources that might help ISPs to economi-
cally sustain their network infrastructure. In our first work, we assess economic incentives
for transit providers to boost transit revenues by attracting customer traffic. As men-
tioned earlier, a transit provider’s revenue depends on the volume of customer traffic, i.e.,
the transit revenue increases as the customer-traffic volume increases. Therefore, in order
to generate more revenues, a transit provider may have a financial interest in attract-
ing extra customer traffic [22, 23]. First, we analyze a real incident of YouTube’s traffic
attraction that occurred in early 2008. Next, motivated by the insights from this real
case study, we conduct in-depth studies for hypothetical scenarios of traffic attraction by
ISPs across the transit hierarchy. Based on real empirical data for the Internet’s AS-level
topology and traffic, our extensive simulations and sensitivity analyses reveal that traffic
attraction and reaction to it redistribute traffic on the inter-AS links and create camps
of winning, losing and neutral ASes with respect to transit payments. Despite various
countermeasures by losing ASes, the traffic attraction remains effective unless ASes from
the winning camp cooperate with the losing ASes. Although the traffic attraction has
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
a potential to significantly increase revenues for transit providers, this technique might
have negative reputation and legal consequences for the ISPs.
Next, we explore content hosting as a source of extra revenue. In our second work, we
dissect the global hosting ecosystem to discover a wide presence of transit ISPs offering
hosting and content delivery services. To explore the global content hosting ecosystem, we
conduct real Internet-scale measurements using a novel technique that leverages a Virtual
Private Network (VPN) to collect real online contents from top 2,165 websites across
52 countries, and use a vast network of around 22,000 open recursive Domain Naming
System (DNS) vantage points to discover the infrastructures hosting the online contents.
Our results show that ISPs host online contents across the transit hierarchy, significantly
on tier-2 and tier-3 transit ASes, followed by access ASes, CSPs, and tier-1 transit ASes.
The latter results are valuable for realistically modeling of the content traffic matrix.
Besides, our analyses also provide realistic understanding on the network characteristics
of the hosting infrastructures and content delivery performance as perceived by end users.
While transit providers seek extra revenues in hosting of online contents, access
providers face rising network costs due to the increasing volume of bandwidth-intensive
content traffic. In our third and final work, we evaluate an economic model for access
ISPs to derive extra revenues from online advertisements. First, we evaluate an ad-based
revenue model for access ISPs. Then, we analyze its revenue potential and economic
viability for different access ISPs. We validate our model using financial data collected
from two, one large and one medium-sized, access ISPs operating in India. Our analyses
demonstrate a significant revenue potential up to 50% of the capital expenses) for the
large access ISP and non-trivial gain up to 5% of the capital expenses for the medium-
sized access ISP. Next, we establish conditions for economic viability of the model. Lastly,
we demonstrate various incentives (6–9 Mbps extra speed or 12–20 GB extra data) that
an access ISP can offer to subscribers of an ad-subsidized Internet plans. Unlike the
content-sponsorship models where CSPs directly compensate access ISPs for content de-
livery costs, our ad-based revenue model relies on direct collaboration of access ISPs with
advertisers, lessening the concerns about network neutrality.
1.3 Thesis overview
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background information related
to our research area. In Chapter 3, we present our studies on economics of customer-traffic
attraction by transit providers to boost transit revenues. In chapter 4, we conduct a real
Internet-scale measurement study of the global content hosting ecosystem to explore the
presence of transit providers in the hosting of online contents. In chapter 5, we derive an
ad-based revenue model for access ISPs. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a discussion
of our research findings and future work on economic, technical, and security aspects of
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the Internet infrastructure spectrum.
1.4 Research publications out of our contributions
Accepted papers:
• Pradeep Bangera and Sergey Gorinsky, “Traffic Attraction by Internet Transit
Providers: An Economic Perspective”, in the Proceedings of IFIP Networking
2014 [24].
• Pradeep Bangera and Sergey Gorinsky, “An Economic Perspective on Traffic At-
traction by Internet Transit Providers”, in the Proceedings of IEEE ICNP 2013
(Poster) [25].
• Pradeep Bangera and Sergey Gorinsky, “Impact of Prefix Hijacking on Payments of
Providers”, in the Proceedings of COMSNETS 2011 [26].
Working papers:
• Pradeep Bangera, and Sergey Gorinsky, “Content versus Ads: Dissecting the Host-
ing Ecosystem” Part of this work was accepted by IFIP Networking 2016 and later
withdrawn from publication.
• Pradeep Bangera, Syed Hasan and Sergey Gorinsky, “AdBroadband: Analysis of
Economic Viability of Ad-based Revenue Model for Access ISPs”

Chapter 2
Background and Basic
Information
In this chapter, we present and discuss basic information pertaining to our research
problems.
2.1 Basic building blocks of the Internet
While the complex interconnections of routers and switches have spun the Internet, the
AS-level graph is commonly employed for visualizing the Internet topology. For universal
end-to-end communication, ISPs utilize the Internet Protocol (IP) [27] for addressing net-
work interfaces in the Internet, and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [28] for establishing
AS-level paths to destinations.
2.1.1 Internet Protocol (IP)
An IP prefix is a succinct representation for contiguous IP addresses owned by an AS.
An IP router contains a routing and forwarding table. The IP prefixes associated with
various destination networks are stored in the routing table. For traffic engineering, an AS
might deaggregate an IP prefix into multiple longer prefixes and announce these longer
deaggregated prefixes to other ASes via BGP [29]. The routing table contains separate
entries for multiple paths to the same IP prefixes learned by a router from different
neighboring routers. The forwarding table in a router compactly maps each IP prefix
to an output interface of the router. During packet transmission, an IP router quickly
forwards an incoming IP packet to the output link determined through the longest-prefix
match rule, which selects the longest among the matching prefixes.
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2.1.2 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
While IP addresses identify network-device interfaces in the Internet, BGP establishes
inter-domain connectivity between neighboring ASes to enable traffic between them. BGP
is a path-vector protocol that serves as a de facto standard protocol for routing between
ASes and exchanges AS-level best-path announcements between neighboring ASes to sup-
port global reachability of IP prefixes. The announcing AS either owns the advertised
prefixes or learns about the best paths to the prefixes from other neighboring ASes.
Generally, BGP selects the best path to a destination IP prefix by comparing the path
attributes of different AS-level paths. Usually, network operators configure routing poli-
cies in the router to set operator-preferred path attributes instead of relying on default
BGP values.
BGP uses various attributes that can influence the best path of the incoming IP
traffic, such as AS-PATH length, origin-type, and MED. The AS-PATH length denotes
the number of AS hops to reach a destination IP prefix. The origin-type attribute can
assume three values: IGP (BGP-originated routes), EGP (Exterior Gateway Protocol
routes) and INCOMPLETE (for other protocols). The Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED)
is used to assign priorities among multiple links of the AS with its immediate neighbors.
During the selection of the best path to an IP prefix, BGP first prefers the shortest AS
path to an IP prefix. To break ties between two paths with equal lengths, BGP prefers the
path having the IGP attribute over the path with EGP and INCOMPLETE attributes.
To receive traffic from a neighboring AS on the most-prioritized link, operators assign the
smallest MED value for the preferred link.
For storing and processing the path attributes, BGP maintains 3 logical tables called
RIBs (Routing Information Bases) [30, 28, 31]: (1) Adj-RIB-In (Adjacent RIB Input)
stores all learned AS level paths, including multiple paths per prefix; (2) Loc-RIB (Local
RIB) remembers the best path for every prefix; (3) Adj-RIB-Out (Adjacent RIB Output)
stores the paths announced to other routers.
2.1.3 Inter-AS business relation types
Before employing IP and BGP for traffic delivery, each ISP first negotiates and forms
economic agreements for interconnections with neighboring ASes. In the transit agree-
ment, customer ASes pay their transit providers for traffic delivery. Usually, the business-
relation type between a customer AS and its transit provider is called customer-provider
(or provider-customer) [32] relation. Unlike transit agreements, peering agreements do
not result in inter-AS traffic delivery payments, but ASes equally share peering infrastruc-
ture costs [33]. The inter-AS relation type in the latter is called a peering relationship.
Further, a link between two ASes that belong to the same ISP is called a sibling link.
Traffic on sibling links does not result in any inter-provider payment.
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2.1.4 Network and content hosting infrastructure
While ISPs negotiate and interconnect their networks, each ISP offers specialized
services to cater to different sections of customers, such as transit customers, CSPs, and
residential users.
Transit ASes are interconnected in a hierarchical pattern, with large tier-1 ASes at the
top of the hierarchy (i.e., the Internet core) and smaller tier-3 ASes at the bottom of the
hierarchy. The tier-1 transit providers operate large network infrastructures, consisting
of one or more ASes spanning the globe and having Points of Presence (PoP) in multiple
countries. The tier-1 providers do not pay any other ISPs for traffic exchange. They
usually maintain settlement-free peering relationships with other tier-1 providers and
receive payments from their transit customers for sending and receiving traffic. There are
about a dozen of ISPs that are tier-1 [34]. Tier-2 transit providers are smaller than the
tier-1 providers, have continental coverage, and pay tier-1 providers for traffic delivery.
Tier-3 providers are usually regional and national transit providers that buy transit from
tier-2 or tier-1 ISPs. The transit providers commonly employ the 95th-percentile billing
model for charging for transit of customer traffic [35, 36]. This method measures the
average traffic rate over each 5-minute interval during a 1-month billing period and then
uses the 95th percentile of all the individual traffic-rate samples as a basis for calculating
the monthly bill.
Hosting ISPs and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [37, 38] specialize in hosting
and delivering the online contents of CSPs. The CDNs distribute the online contents by
deploying caches in different ASes across the Internet hierarchy and across geography. As
a result, end users enjoy low latencies and high throughput because of the geographical
proximity of the content caches. To fetch the contents from the nearest caches, CDNs usu-
ally employ IP anycast forwarding [39] or their proprietary protocols by using a Canonical
Name (CNAME) record to select the best cache. The selection considers various metrics,
such as the user location, cache load, inter-AS path length, and link latencies. While
CDNs carefully select in which ASes to place caches to improve content delivery per-
formance, access ISPs also have economic incentives to offer their networks for cache
placements in order to reduce their transit costs by delivering most traffic locally rather
than through a transit-provider link.
Demand for Internet access is rising as online contents prove themselves greatly valu-
able for satisfying information, entertainment and business needs. The technological
advancement in the Internet access infrastructure has evolved from a dial-up Internet ac-
cess with the maximum data speed of 56 Kbps to high-speed broadband access with data
speeds over 100 Mbps, suitable for the current bandwidth-intensive online contents. With
the growing demand for higher Internet speeds as well as increasing competition in the
access market, access ISPs have been continuously upgrading their network capacity and
geographical coverage by making huge capital investments year-on-year. Driven by in-
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tense competition, most of the access ISPs have adopted the fixed monthly payment model
that is largely traffic-agnostic. Therefore, as end users consume more online contents, the
access ISPs experience higher traffic delivery costs. Besides cache placement collabora-
tions with CDNs to reduce traffic costs, access ISPs also started negotiating with CSPs
to sponsor the delivery of online contents to end users, i.e., CSPs are asked to pay some
fraction of the cost incurred by access ISPs for delivering the content traffic. The latter
content sponsorship model recently attracted much academic research interests [40–42]
and also intense debates on protecting network neutrality.
2.1.5 Content service providers and online advertisements
While transit and access ISPs face low returns on their network infrastructure in-
vestments due to the unsustainable traffic costs, CSPs earn high revenues through online
advertisements. Presently, almost all of the online ads are published by CSPs via their
websites and mobile applications.
In the Internet economic ecosystem as a whole, a major share of the revenues come
from online ads. Online ads enable CSPs to offer end users free access to a vast number
of online contents and applications. Unlike the advertising in printed and broadcast
electronic media, advertising on the Internet provides better control over the delivery
of ads to the right set of audience, thus maximizing the Return-on-Investment (ROI)
for the advertisers. The entities that advertise their products are known as advertisers.
The CSPs who offer space on their websites for displaying ads are known as publishers.
The entity that links the advertisers and publishers for displaying ads is known as an ad
network. The ad network aggregates ads from several advertisers and selects a relevant
website for displaying an ad. The process of displaying a single ad on a website is referred
to as an ad impression. CSPs attract billions of end users to their websites, providing a
highly appealing platform for the advertisers to publicize their products.
Thus, CSPs maintain contracts with one or more ad networks or may operate their
own ad network to receive relevant ads. Besides aggregating ads from several hundreds
of advertisers, an ad network also partners with behavioral targeting agencies to gain
insights into user interests. Upon receiving the user visits, a website sends a request to
the ad network to fetch relevant ads. The ad network then selects a relevant ad in real
time, after processing a number of information, such as the advertisers’ bid prices, ad
quality score, website ranking, website category, and user profile. This information is
gathered by the behavioral targeting agencies using web cookies. Finally, a relevant ad
from the highest bidder is displayed on the target website.
For pricing, the advertisers are charged by the ad networks using one of the three
popular ad pricing models, such as cost per mille (CPM), cost per click (CPC) and
cost per user action (CPA). Each pricing model serves different business objectives. The
CPM model is typically employed in brand awareness campaigns. The CPC and CPA
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models are generally used for attracting traffic and sales respectively. In the CPM model,
the advertisers pay for every 1000 ad impressions on the websites. In CPC and CPA
respectively, the advertisers pay for every ad click and purchase made by end users on
the websites. The ad revenues are then shared between the CSP and ad network based
on their contract.

Chapter 3
Economics of Traffic Attraction by
Transit ISPs
3.1 Introduction
Internet transit is a massive decentralized economy where thousands of ISPs sell and
resell traffic-delivery services. Transit revenues depend on traffic rates: the more traffic
the provider transits, the larger the revenue is. As more Internet traffic bypasses the
transit services due to peering arrangements, the transit ISPs miss on earning transit
revenues on this traffic. Data from TeleGeography [8] reveals that the share of traffic
passing through the transit networks reduced from 47% in 2010 to 41% in 2014. Besides,
the per-unit transit traffic prices also decline.
Traffic attraction refers to a family of BGP [28] techniques enabling an AS to re-
ceive traffic that would otherwise flow elsewhere. Because a transit provider receives
payments for transit of customer traffic, the provider has a direct financial interest in at-
tracting extra traffic of customers, e.g., when competing with another provider for transit
traffic of a multihomed customer [22, 23]. While some of prior studies on traffic attrac-
tion [43–46] indicate that attraction of extra traffic provides economic benefits to transit
providers, the prior work mostly focuses on security rather than traffic economics. The
previous security-themed work examines various traffic-attraction techniques and argues
that secure versions of BGP or configuring prefix-filtering policies do not neutralize them.
There is also a body of related game-theoretic and simulation-based studies [23, 47, 48]
that include economic considerations but analyze traffic attraction in small-scale artificial
settings.
In this chapter, we study the economics of traffic attraction by transit providers to
increase their transit revenues. We begin by analyzing a real traffic-attraction incident in
the Internet. Motivated by the insights obtained from the analysis of this real incident,
we conduct further studies, from economic and technical perspectives, of hypothetical
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scenarios of traffic attraction by providers across the transit hierarchy.
3.2 Real case study of YouTube traffic attraction
In early 2008, YouTube owned AS 365611 with five assigned prefix spaces according
to the RIPE RIS Dashboard [49]. 208.65.152.0/22 represented one such space and is the
prefix that attracted a majority of YouTube-addressed traffic. On the 24th of February
in 2008, AS 17557 belonging to PTCL (Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited)
hijacked YouTube traffic for approximately two hours and fourteen minutes by announcing
the more specific prefix 208.65.153.0/24. The intention of the hijacking was to block
access to YouTube within the state of Pakistan but the impact was significantly more far-
reaching because PTCL announced 208.65.153.0/24 also to its provider PCCW Global
(AS 3491), and the latter advertised globally the bogus PTCL paths for the longer prefix.
Consequently, PTCL became a black hole that attracted and discarded packets sent to
YouTube from all over the global Internet. YouTube detected the sharp decrease in its
incoming traffic and reacted by announcing the even more specific prefix 208.65.153.0/25.
The countermeasure restored some traffic flow to YouTube, yet PTCL remained able to
attract a nontrivial fraction of YouTube-addressed traffic due to the path length and other
factors that affect the routing policies of various ASes [50].
3.2.1 Methodology
The specific basis for our traffic attraction investigation is the above real incident of
prefix hijacking. The incident attracted significant attention and was actively discussed by
operators and researchers on NANOG (North American Network Operator Group) mail-
ing list [51]. Whereas, the Internet incorporates BGP announcement monitoring systems
such as PHAS (Prefix Hijack Alert System) [52], RIPE RIS (Re´seaux IP Europe´ens Rout-
ing Information Service) [49] and BGPmon (BGP monitoring and analyzer tool) [53], our
analysis relies on actual announcement data collected by the monitoring systems during
the hijacking incident.
The adopted research method supplements the real-data analysis with simulations for
two reasons. First, the available real data do not paint the full picture of the traffic at-
traction incidents. Second, simulations enable us to examine suppositional scenarios that
are more suitable for revenue-boosting traffic attraction. Our choice for the simulation
platform is C-BGP [54], a widely used simulator for BGP routing problems. C-BGP de-
termines AS-level paths for all traffic and bidirectional traffic rates for every inter-domain
link in the simulated topology. The BGP routing policies [32] in C-BGP satisfy the
valley-free routing conditions [55]. Although real Internet routing occasionally deviates
1Before Google restructured YouTube.
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from such policies, valley-free routing constitutes a reasonable approximation because we
are mostly interested in qualitative insights.
3.2.1.1 Topology
To initialize C-BGP with a realistic contemporary AS-level topology of the Inter-
net, we use a data set collected by CAIDA (Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis) [56] at the time of the real hijacking incident. The AS-level Internet topology
is as per the CAIDA data set dated 21 February 2008 and captures relationships be-
tween 27184 ASes. The CAIDA data set classifies relationships between a pair of ASes as
customer-provider (encoded as -1 in the data set), provider-customer (encoded as 1), and
peering (encoded as 0). We remove from each data set all customer-provider pairs because
of their redundancy: for every provider-customer relationship provided to C-BGP, the
simulator automatically configures a transit link associated with both provider-customer
and corresponding customer-provider relationships. Since C-BGP does not recognize sib-
ling relationships between ASes, we also substitute sibling relationships (encoded as 2)
with peering relationships. The number of sibling relationships in the CAIDA data set is
small, and the substitution has a negligible impact on the fidelity of the simulations.
3.2.1.2 Traffic
While YouTube-bound traffic contains video clips uploaded by YouTube users as well
as requests for clip downloads, the uploads are likely to dominate the requests in terms
of the traffic volume, and we focus only on this former type of traffic. According to [57],
video was uploaded to YouTube in 2008 at the rate of 12 hours per minute, meaning
that the volume of video clips uploaded every minute was such that playing them one
after another would take 12 hours. After analyzing a collection of video clips in the FLV
(FLash Video) format with playing times in the range from 1 minute to 1.3 hours, we
estimate that 1 hour of playing time corresponds to 100 MB of data. Hence, our estimate
for the average year-2008 rate of YouTube-addressed traffic is 160 Mbps.
Determining the origins of the YouTube-addressed traffic is a more challenging task.
ISPs commonly perceive exchanged traffic volumes as sensitive information. While we
are aware of anonymized data sets that quantify the relative potency of various ASes to
generate traffic, the goal of our study necessitates associating a generated traffic volume
with each specific AS. Without having access to real data sets of the latter type, we
allocate the generated traffic to all BGP-connected ASes uniformly, i.e., each AS in our
C-BGP simulations generates YouTube-addressed traffic at the same rate of 6 Kbps.
Our simulations rely on the aforementioned synthetic traffic to evaluate the impact
of prefix hijacking on inter-provider links. With each AS in the Internet-scale topologies,
we associate the traffic demand for the advertised prefix. Then, we utilize C-BGP to
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Figure 3.1: Number of BGP paths through transit ASes (a) before the YouTube's prefix 
hijacking by PTCL and (b) after PTCL hijacks all YouTube-bound traffic. 
determine the rate of traffic flowing in both directions of each inter-ISP link. We refer to 
this traffic rate as a link load of the inter-provider link. 
3.2.2 Impact of traffic attraction on Inter-AS paths and traffic 
In accordance with our general simulation methodology from Section 3.2.1, we per-
form two simulation runs. In the first run, YouTube (AS 36561) announces its prefix 
208.65.152.0/22. In the subsequent run, PTCL (AS 17557) additionally advertises its 
sham ownership of the more specific prefix 208.65.153.0/24 to hijack YouTube-addressed 
traffic. The C-BGP simulations reveal the complete success of the PTCL hijacking at-
tempt: as a result of announcing the longer prefix, PTCL starts receiving all YouTube-
addressed traffic with no continued delivery to YouTube itself. This simulation outcome 
is consistent with the historical accounts of the actual hijacking incident [50] . After each 
of the runs, C-BGP ident ifies exactly 100 ASes as being unable to reach any announced 
prefix. Hence, the number of BGP-connected ASes in the reported simulations stands 
at 27,084. 
3.2.2.1 Connectivity of transit ASes to the advertised prefix 
In the following, we examine the impact of the hijacking on the BGP connectivity 
of all transit providers to the announced prefix, i.e., we focus on the transit ASes which 
forward traffic from other ISPs to the advertising entity. Using C-BGP, we determine all 
converged BGP paths in the simulated scenario. Then , for each transit AS, we count the 
number of paths from other ASes through this transit AS to t he advertising entity. Below, 
we interchangeably refer to this value as the number of served BGP paths or BGP path 
count of the transit AS. Figure 3.1 presents t he number of BGP paths through the transit 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage transit traffic changes for the top-5 winning and loosing transit 
ASes. 
ASes, before and after the PTCL hijacks YouTube's prefix. The name of the organization 
that owned the transit AS number during the time of the prefix-hijacking incident in year 
2008 is reported. 
Before the prefix hijacking by PTCL, the converged routing involves 2,878 transit 
ASes. TransitRail (AS 11164) serves 9,733 paths and is the largest last-hop aggregator 
of YouTube-bound traffic. Level3 (AS 3356), Hurricane (AS 6939), Sprint (AS 1239), 
and Cogent (AS 174) are also connected directly to YouTube and constitute the next four 
biggest carriers of its incoming traffic with 3,983, 3,863, 3,487, and 3,395 served BGP paths 
respectively, as shown in figure 3.l(a). After PTCL hijacks all YouTube-bound traffic, the 
number of transit ASes decreases to 2,760. Figure 3.l(b) shows the number of BGP paths 
served through these large transit ASes to PTCL after the hijacking. The BGP path 
counts for the five giants TransitRail, Level3, Hurricane, Sprint, and Cogent shrink to 5, 
1,915, 1,124, 1,854, and 2648 respectively. The preserved paths do not lead to YouTube 
anymore but instead contribute to the hijacking success of PTCL. The top-3 providers 
with the largest BGP path counts after the hijacking are PCCW Global (AS 3491), BT 
Global (AS 5400), and Telecom Italia Seabone (AS 6762): the hijacking boosts their BGP 
path counts from 219, 206, and 164 to 12,942, 7,793, and 6,319 respectively. 
3.2.2.2 Traffic changes of the transit ASes 
Whereas the BGP path counts highlight the transit potential of the ASes, the actual 
quantity of traffic passing through the transit ASes depends on the traffic engineering 
goals set by the operators based on their economic policies. Hence, this section utilizes 
the computed BGP paths to derive the link loads of all inter-AS links of each transit AS to 
compute the percentage of transit traffic changes arising because of the traffic attraction 
by PTCL. As shown in figure 3.2, the largest transit traffic increase of 450% is observed 
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for MCI (AS 702)2, followed by Verizon (AS 701), AT&T (AS 7018), SBC (AS 7132)3,
and Savvis (AS 3561) at 170%, 91%, 48% and 7%, respectively. Among the top traffic
losers, Swisscom (AS 3303) faces the largest 80% reduction, followed by Global Crossing
(AS 3549)4, Level 3 (AS 3356), Sprint (AS 1239) and Cogent (AS 174) losing 58%, 52%,
47% and 22% respectively.
3.3 Traffic attraction by large transit ISPs
While the above work – by using the real data to drive the simulations – offers in-
teresting insights, it also identifies promising directions for further research of the topic.
Our results suggest that large transit ISPs face higher traffic changes. Hence, they have
the strongest financial incentives to attract traffic to increase transit revenues. This indi-
cates that traffic attraction can create a fertile ground for tussles between ISPs. Next, to
accurately translate the BGP path counts and inter-AS link load into transit revenues, it
is important to account for Internet cross-traffic. As our experience shows, scalability of
C-BGP simulations are serious obstacles to incorporate the cross-traffic in C-BGP.
In this section, we conduct in-depth studies from an economic perspective, where
transit ASes try to boost their revenues by attracting transit traffic and then delivering
it to the proper destinations. We strive to model the traffic matrices realistically to
account for the cross-traffic and overcome C-BGP scalability challenges by enhancing
the memory management in C-BGP. We also enable C-BGP to provide the attract-then-
deliver feature for our economic analysis of traffic attraction by the transit ASes. We focus
on the economics of customer-traffic attraction by providers across the transit hierarchy
and report extensive C-BGP [54] simulations in an Internet-scale model configured with
realistic data on inter-domain traffic, topology, and pricing. We consider attractors from
the top 3 tiers of the transit hierarchy as well as 3 types of reactions by other ASes to
the attraction: (1) filtering, i.e., discarding the BGP announcements that trigger the
attraction, (2) disconnection by discontented customers, i.e., severance of their business
relationships with the attractor altogether, and (3) attempts of discontented ASes to
attract extra traffic to themselves. The broader scope and higher realism – combined
with sensitivity studies – enable our work to offer deeper quantitative insights into traffic-
attraction economics and reach reliable qualitative conclusions.
The specific BGP technique for traffic attraction in our study is prefix deaggregation.
Although BGP is a sophisticated protocol, it does not provide an AS with a reliable
mechanism to validate the path information announced by neighboring ASes. Due to the
longest-prefix match rule of IP forwarding, the BGP announcement of a longer deaggre-
gated prefix steers traffic to the announced path. Multihomed ASes routinely employ
2AS 702 is now operated by Verizon Business
3AS 7132 is now operated by AT&T Internet Services
4AS 3549 is now operated by Level 3 Communications
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Figure 3.3: Example of traffic attraction via prefix deaggregation: (a) before attraction; 
(b) after attraction. 
prefix deaggregation to balance their incoming traffic among their multiple connections 
to the Internet. Instead of the load balancing by multihomed ASes, our paper studies 
attraction of additional customer traffic. We consider the kind of prefix deaggregation 
where an intermediary AS learns a prefix from a customer, deaggregates the prefix, and 
announces all longer prefixes to each of its other customers. In particular, the traffic-
attracting AS splits a learned prefix equally into 2 longer prefixes and announces both 
longer prefixes to the customers (Note that the AS deliberately does not announce the 
deaggregated prefixes to any of its peers so that none of its current traffic shifts from its 
customer links to its peering links). 
To illustrate how prefix deaggregation enables traffic attraction, we consider a simple 
scenario in figure 3.3, where networks B and C directly learn prefix x from their mutual 
customer A. In figure 3.3(a), providers Band C propagate prefix x to their another mutual 
customer D, network D sends t raffic to network A t hrough provider B, and network B 
collects transit payments from both customers A and D. In figure 3.3(b), when provider C 
deaggregates prefix x into longer prefixes y and z, and announces these prefixes y and z 
to customer D , the traffic from network D to network A is attracted to flow through 
provider C rather than provider B; consequently, the traffic-delivery payments from both 
customers A and D go to provider C instead of provider B. 
While the considered prefix-deaggregation method is easily implementable in prac-
tice, a transit AS can also attract extra traffic by employing a different BGP technique. 
For example, the intermediate AS can attract additional traffic by reducing the path 
length in a propagated BGP announcement. There is anecdotal evidence that promi-
nent ASes attract extra customer traffic by rewriting the origin attribute in propagated 
BGP announcements [15, 16] . These and other alternative techniques for traffic attraction 
represent an interesting topic for future studies on traffic economics. 
For t he role of traffic attractors, we select ASes throughout the Internet transit bierar-
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chy. Whereas tier-1 networks are in the strongest position to attract significant amounts
of extra traffic, our interactions with industry experts suggest that traffic attraction by
tier-2 ASes is more common. In addition to traffic attraction by tier-1 and tier-2 transit
providers, we also examine traffic attraction by tier-3 networks.
3.3.1 Model
Our modeling strives to abstract the highly complicated problem into a manageable
representation for realistic study and discussion. Instead of focusing on a single setting, we
parameterize our AS-level Internet model to experiment with realistic ranges of parameter
settings.
3.3.1.1 Topology
Despite a decade of intensive research, the AS-level Internet topology is not known
accurately, e.g., due to missed links [58]. To deal with this uncertainty, we consider 3
alternatives including topologies reported by CAIDA on 2012/6/1 and UCLA [59] on
2012/5/1. The third topology, to which we refer as UCLA+, is synthetic. We derive it
from the UCLA topology by adding links that UCLA reported for at least 15 out of the
30 subsequent days. The enhancement contributes 1,656 peering and 75 transit links to
the UCLA+ topology.
3.3.1.2 Traffic
Characterizing the inter-domain traffic is another notoriously hard problem. Our
study considers 9 traffic matrices guided by empirical Internet data. The matrices gener-
alize the measurement results suggesting that (a) the fraction of traffic originated by the
largest content source was about 5% in 2009 and growing [60], and (b) the distribution of
traffic from origin ASes is Zipf-like with the shape parameter between 0.9 and 1.1 [60,61].
We obtain the 9 = 3∗3 traffic matrices by combining 3 settings along each of the following
2 dimensions: (1) overall distribution function of origin traffic shares and (2) assignment
of the traffic shares to specific ASes.
For the overall distribution of the origin traffic shares, we consider 3 instances of the
Zipf-Mandelbrot function defined as K/(r+ v)D, where r refers to the rank of the AS, D
denotes the shape parameter, and K and v are constants. The instance settings are as
follows:
[Z1] D = 1.1, K = 0.181, and v = 0.5;
[Z2] D = 0.9, K = 0.072, and v = 0;
[Z3] D = 0.7, K = 0.108, and v = 0.
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Figure 3.4 depicts the 3 overall traffic-share functions that cover the realistic ranges 
for the shape parameter (from 0.7 to 1.1) and largest traffic share (from 3% to 12%) . 
To assign the traffic shares to specific ASes, i.e., to set rank r of each AS, we consider 
the following 3 diverse options for the ranking metric: 
[R.1] peering coefficient, which is t he number of peers divided by the total number of 
providers and customers of the AS; the peering coefficient tends to be the highest 
among small/intermediate ASes that provide access to content hosts (these ASes 
have many peers but few transit links); 
[R.2] IP address count, i.e. , the number of IP addresses originated by the AS; 
[R.3] website visit frequency, i.e. , the number of users who visit the websites hosted by 
the AS. 
We use notation Z1 Ro to denote the traffic matrix with overall traffic-share function 
z, and AS ranking metric RJ. 
In each of the 9 traffic matrices, we distribute the originated traffic of an AS among 
destinations (i.e., content-consuming ASes) in proportion to the IP address counts of 
the destination ASes. In addition to the above content traffic, our traffic matrices also 
incorporate peer-to-peer traffic, with the peer-to-peer traffic between a pair of ASes set 
proportionally to the IP address count of each AS in the pair. 
3.3.1.3 Pricing 
In comparison to traffic, pricing of inter-AS relationships is even more difficult to infer 
due to confidential bilateral agreements guarding them. Empirical evidence indicates that 
IP transit is subject to subadditive pricing where prices per Mbps are lower for higher 
traffic rates. In particular, the empirical data suggest as reasonable the following pricing 
function [62, 5, 4]: the monthly payment from the customer to the provider of transit 
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link l is tl = b · Lm where L denotes the traffic rate in Mbps, b = 45, and m = 0.75 (the
computed payment is in U.S. dollars). Our study generalizes this transit pricing function
by considering the range of m values from 0.4 to 1, i.e., from heavy economies of scale to
linear pricing which does not offer any price discount for higher traffic rates.
While the 95th-percentile billing [35,36] is common in IP transit charging, this method
requires a large number of individual traffic-rate samples. Instead of modeling the traffic
at a fine-grained time scale, we directly represent the traffic of each transit link as the
95th-percentile rate because: (a) fine-grained traffic statistics are not publicly available
for most ASes, and (b) simulations for a detailed traffic model do not scale to a large
population of ASes.
Peering relationships are usually free of financial settlements between the peers. On
the other hand, maintaining a peering link does involve costs, e.g., payments to an IXP
(Internet eXchange Point) [58] that provides the physical infrastructure for peering. To
represent the peer’s cost of maintaining its peering link l, we adopt peering-cost function
pl = 20 ·L0.4 suggested in prior work [62,5,4]. In comparison to the transit-link payment
for the same traffic rate, the peering cost is always lower but not negligible.
To determine the overall traffic-delivery payment for each AS, we partition all external
links of the AS into 3 sets: set V contains the transit links where the AS is a provider, set U
is for the transit links where the AS acts as a customer, and set G includes all its peering
links. Then, the monthly traffic-delivery payment of the AS is P =
∑
l∈V
tl −
∑
l∈U
tl −
∑
l∈G
pl
with positive values denoting traffic-delivery revenues, and negative values representing
traffic-delivery expenses.
3.3.2 Evaluation methodology
To evaluate traffic attraction and countermeasures by other ASes, we conduct large-
scale simulations in C-BGP [54]. We optimize C-BGP to overcome its scalability limita-
tions. For example, even if each AS announces a single prefix only, the standard C-BGP
can exhaust a relatively large physical memory before computing stable AS-level paths.
We improve the memory management of C-BGP to scale up the simulations to at least
6,000 prefix announcements. We integrated the memory-scalability feature into C-BGP
and supplied the modified version to the C-BGP code repository [63].
While our optimizations alleviate – but not eliminate – the C-BGP scalability limi-
tations, we conduct the simulations by focusing on the core of each topology and repre-
sentative prefixes of the ASes. We extract the topological core by excluding all the stub
ASes and all their links. For the 3 examined topologies, their cores contain around 6,000
transit ASes. We determine traffic-delivery payments for all these transit ASes. Although
the simulations do not directly consider the stub ASes outside the topological core, we
account for the traffic of these ASes when computing the traffic-delivery payments for the
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transit ASes. While real ASes generally own and announce several prefixes, the C-BGP
scalability limitations prevent announcing multiple prefixes from each AS. On the other
hand, a single prefix per AS is sufficient for C-BGP to simulate all inter-domain commu-
nications in the topological core. Therefore, we associate the total inter-domain traffic of
each AS with a single representative prefix of this AS.
To configure our traffic matrices, we rely on real data. Based on the Cisco-VNI
statistics [64], we set the total rates of the inter-domain content and peer-to-peer traffic
to 45 Tbps and 15 Tbps respectively, with 4 times more content traffic flowing from
servers to clients than from clients to servers. We specify the IP address counts of the
ASes according to the CIDR report [65]. The peering-coefficient ranks of ASes are in
accordance with the CAIDA topology. We calculate the website visit frequencies based
on the data provided by the Alexa Web Information Service from Amazon for top 100,000
websites [66].
Among the 6,000+ transit ASes in the topological cores, we select 30 ASes to act as
traffic attractors. Each of tiers 1, 2, and 3 in the transit hierarchy contributes exactly
10 ASes (those with the largest numbers of customers) to the attractor set. We refer to
the 10-AS groups as T1, T2, and T3 respectively. To denote AS β from tier α, we use
notation Tαβ.
Our main metric is payment change. It measures the relative change in the traffic-
delivery payment of the AS in comparison to the baseline scenario where no AS tries to
attract additional traffic.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we report the results for the following default set-
tings. The topology is from CAIDA. The results are averaged over the 9 traffic matrices.
Transit-pricing exponent m is set to 0.75. When deaggregating prefixes to attract traffic,
the attracting AS deaggregates prefixes announced by its 100 largest customers. We also
study sensitivity of the results to the topology, traffic, and pricing.
3.3.3 Evaluation results
3.3.3.1 Attraction by a single AS
We start by examining what happens when a single AS attempts to attract traffic.
We repeat this experiment for the 30 attractors with each of the 9 traffic matrices and
record the payment change for the attracting AS. Using box plots, figure 3.5 presents the
results arranged according to the tier of the attracting AS. The plots demonstrate that
transit ASes have significant financial incentives to attract traffic: the median payment
change is 148%, 38%, and 21% for T1, T2, and T3 respectively. The tier-1 networks
are in the strongest position to benefit from traffic attraction because they sell transit to
numerous customers but do not buy transit themselves. Being less central in the transit
hierarchy, all considered tier-2 ASes are still able to raise their revenues by attracting
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traffic. While some t ier-3 networks also benefit substantially from the traffic attraction, 
it is not beneficial for other attracting ASes from T3. 
Focusing on the experiments with the tier-1 attractors, figure 3.6 shows that while 
Tlj and Tlc are 2 opposite extremes with the median payment changes of 830% and 
28% respectively, the payment changes for Tlb and the 7 other ASes from Tl are rather 
similar to each other. The large gap between the payment changes for T lj and Tlc is 
mostly due to t he different sizes of these ASes. In comparison to Tlj , Tlc serves more 
transit traffic and attracts a larger amount of extra traffic in absolute terms. Nevertheless 
in relative terms, the payment gain is much higher for the smaller Tlj. 
3.3.3.2 Winners, losers, and neutrals 
By redistributing traffic in the AS-level topology, traffic attraction by an AS affects 
traffic-delivery payments for other ASes. We refer to the ASes with increased traffic-
delivery payments as winners, and to the ASes with negative payment changes as losers. 
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Figure 3.8: Changes in the upstream, downstream, and peering traffic of t he 10 largest 
losers when the attractor is a t ier-1 AS: (a) without filtering; (b) with filtering. 
Neutrals are the ASes with unchanged t raffic-delivery payments. Figure 3.7 plots the 
payment changes for the winning and losing ASes in the experiments of section 3.3.3.1. 
The traffic attraction by t ier-1 networks makes the most divisive impact on the payments: 
the fractions of winners, losers, and neutrals are 17%, 26%, and 57% respectively. When 
the attracting AS is from T2, the fractions of winners and losers decrease to 11 % and 8% 
respectively. After the traffic attraction by tier-3 networks, the impact is highly local: 
either winners or losers comprise only 1% of the AS population. 
3.3.3.3 Impact on traffic 
To understand where t he attracted traffic comes from, we classify the inter-domain 
traffic of an AS into 3 types: (1) upstream, i.e., t raffic from t he AS to its providers, 
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(2) downstream, i.e., t raffic from the AS to its customers, and (3) peering, i.e., traffic on 
the peering links of the AS. Then, we consider the 10 ASes that suffer the largest declines 
(in absolute terms) of their traffic-delivery payments after the traffic attraction by the T l 
networks. These largest losers are 4 tier-1, 5 tier-2, and 1 tier-3 ASes. F igure 3.8a depicts 
changes in the upstream, downstream, and peering traffic of these 10 losers after the 
attraction. While t he losing tier-1 ASes have no upstream traffic either with or without 
the attraction, their downstream traffic decreases, suggesting that the lost downstream 
traffic is acquired by the attractor. The attraction makes a qualitatively similar impact 
on the traffic of T2b and T2e. For the 3 other largest losers from the lower tiers, the 
upstream traffic increases due to sending more t raffic to the tier-1 attractor, and the 
downstream traffic increases to a smaller extent (e.g., for T 2a) or even decreases (e.g., for 
T2c) . From an overall perspective, the traffic attraction reduces peering traffic and pulls 
extra traffic up the transit hierarchy. 
3.3.3.4 F ilt ering by losin g A Ses 
To analyze responses of other ASes to the traffic attraction, we first consider filtering, 
i.e., discarding the deaggregated prefixes announced by the attractor. Figure 3.9 presents 
the payment change for the attracting AS when all losing ASes from the experiments in 
section 3.3.3.1 do the filtering. Comparing the results in figures 3.5 and 3.9, we see that 
t he filtering reduces but does not remove the financial benefits for the traffic attractor. 
With the filtering, the median payment change for the attracting AS is 37%, 11%, and 
4% for Tl, T2, and T3 respectively. 
Figure 3.8b offers insights into the inability of the filtering to negate the attraction. 
Although the filtering can help a losing AS - e.g., T2a - to reduce its upstream traffic to 
the attractor, the filtering by the loser does not prevent its customers from their switching 
to alternative paths via the attractor. 
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3.3.3.5 Multi-stage rational filtering 
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The filtering examined in section 3.3.3.4 redistributes traffic in t he AS-level topology 
and creates addit ional losers. In this section, we extend the above filtering scenario 
into a multi-stage reaction where the group of filtering ASes on each stage expands by 
incorporating the additional losers from the previous stage. We refer to the filtering by 
losers as rational because it is done only by the ASes that financially suffer from the traffic 
redistribution. To assess the effectiveness of multi-stage rational filtering, we consider 
the setting where stage O corresponds to the t raffic attraction by T l b without filtering. 
Figure 3.10 shows that while the payment change for attractor Tl b decreases on stages 1 
through 3, the payment gain for the attractor stabilizes at 4% after stage 3, which yields 
no additional losers. Hence, even if the filtering is done by all losing ASes, the mult i-stage 
rational filtering does not eliminate financial incentives for the traffic attraction. The 
use and propagation of the deaggregated prefixes by the winners and neutrals allow t he 
attractor to increase its t raffic-delivery revenues. 
3.3.3.6 Cooperative filtering 
While section 3.3.3.5 demonstrates the inability of rational filtering to negate t he 
financial benefits of the attractor, we now explore what happens if the other winning 
ASes go against their own financial interests and also react by filtering t he deaggregated 
prefixes. Referring to such filtering as cooperative, we consider the multi-st age cooperative 
filtering where stage O corresponds to the traffic attraction by Tl b without filtering, 
stage l involves filtering by all losers and neutrals, and each subsequent stage expands 
the group of the filtering ASes with additional winners (selected in the increasing order 
of their payment gain). Figure 3.10 shows that the cooperative filtering negates the 
payment gain of attractor Tlb on stage 5 where t he filtering is done by all customers of 
the attractor. 
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3.3.3. 7 Disconnection 
The evaluation in sections 3.3.3.4 through 3.3.3.6 shows that :filtering is not an effective 
countermeasure unless the winners resist t he t raffic attraction against their own financial 
interests. Now, we examine a more severe reaction by losers where losing customers 
sever their business relationships with t he attracting AS altogether. Again, we consider 
a multi-stage version of the response where stage O corresponds to the traffic attraction 
by Tlb without filtering (and without disconnection) . On stage 1 of the disconnection 
response, the attractor is disconnected from the 1 % of its losing stage-0 customers that are 
selected in the decreasing order of their absolute losses. On each of stages 2 through 7, the 
cumulative number of t he disconnected customers of Tlb doubles. On stage 7 where the 
attractor is disconnected from 45% of all its original customers (i.e., 64% of its losing stage-
0 customers), the attractor still has the payment gain of 8%. On each of the subsequent 
stages, we disconnect all remaining Tlb losing customers from t he previous stage. Both 
stages 8 and 9 create additional losers among the connected Tl b customers. On stage 10 
where the attractor is disconnected from 85% of all its original customers, no new losers 
emerge, and the payment change of Tlb stabilizes. The remaining 15% of all original Tlb 
customers are either winners or neutrals on stage 10 and hence do not disconnect from the 
attractor. Figure 3.11 depicts the dynamics of the mult i-stage disconnection resp onse by 
t he losing customers. T he results demonstrate t hat the disconnection by losing customers 
is ineffective unless a large portion of them terminate their business relationships with 
the attractor. 
3.3 .3.8 Atti·action by m ultiple ASes 
The previous sections show that neit her filtering nor disconnection eliminates the 
financial incentives for traffic attraction unless participation in the response is broad. Now, 
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Figure 3.12: P ayment changes for 10 ASes when the traffic attraction is done by Tlb only 
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F igure 3.13: Changes in the upstream, downstream, and peering traffic of 10 ASes when 
the attraction is done by: (a) Tlb only and (b) all 10 ASes. 
we consider a different reaction where a losing AS defends its traffic-delivery payment by 
attracting extra traffic to itself. Specifically, we consider the scenario where in response to 
the traffic attraction by Tlb the 9 largest losers (in absolute terms) try to attract traffic 
as well. The expanded set of 10 attractors includes 6 t ier-1 , 3 t ier-2, and 1 tier-3 ASes. 
Figure 3.12 shows t he payment changes for these 10 ASes when the traffic attraction is 
done by T lb only vs. all 10 ASes. When all 10 ASes try to attract traffic, all 6 tier-1 
ASes and T2f gain from the traffic attraction but the payment changes for T2b, T2g, 
and T3a are negative. T he results confirm our earlier observation that tier-1 networks 
are in the strongest position to benefit from traffic attraction. Furthermore, figure 3.12 
demonstrates that ASes from lower tiers are not assured to gain from traffic attraction 
when multiple networks attempt to att ract extra t raffic. 
To understand why the t ransit ASes from different tiers fare different ly when mult iple 
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Figure 3.14: Sensitivity of payment changes to the AS-level Internet topology. 
networks try to attract t raffic, figure 3.13 plots the changes in the upstream, downstream, 
and peering traffic of the 10 ASes. When Tlb acts as the only attractor , it greatly 
increases its own downstream traffic and decreases the downstream t raffic for the other 
ASes except T 3a that suffers the loss due to an increase in the upstream traffic. When 
all 10 ASes try to attract traffic, all 6 t ier-1 networks ( which never have any upstream 
t raffic) win by increasing their downstream traffic. For T2f, the downstream traffic grows 
as well, and this growth outweighs the increase in its upstream traffic. On the other band, 
T2b, T2g and T3a remain losers because their upstream traffic grows significantly while 
their downstream traffic increases less (if at all). Some attractors are more powerful than 
others. 
3.3.3.9 Sen sitivity to t h e topology 
To study how sensitive our model is to its assumptions, we first examine its sensitivity 
to the AS-level Internet topology in the scenario where only Tlb attracts traffic. In 
addition to the CAIDA topology, we also consider t he UCLA and UCLA+ topologies . 
Figure 3.14 presents the payment changes for the attractor (which is t he largest winner) 
and 5 largest losers. In quantitative terms, the topology has a substantial impact, e.g., 
the payment change for the attracting AS varies from 85% to 180% with the CAIDA and 
UCLA+ topologies respectively. On the losing side, the maximum loss by an AS varies 
from -9% to -81% with UCLA and UCLA+ topologies respectively. This latter result 
highlights the importance of the topology in general and peering links in particular for 
economic outcomes of traffic attraction. By adding the relatively small numbers of 75 
transit and 1,656 peering links, the enhancement of the topology from UCLA to UCLA+ 
makes the traffic attraction significantly more powerful. The distributions of payment 
changes for all ASes are qualitatively the same in the 3 examined topologies. 
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3.3.3.10 Sensitivity to the traffic matrix 
31 
Expanding the above sensitivity study, we now examine the role of the traffic matrix. 
For each of our 9 traffic matrices, figure 3.15 plots the payment change for attractor 
T lb in 4 scenarios: (1) only Tlb attracts t raffic, (2) attraction is by 10 networks as 
in section 3.3.3.8, (3) filtering is done by all losing networks as in section 3.3.3.4, and 
(4) 50% of the T l b losing customers disconnect from the attractor. The 9 considered 
traffic matrices are diverse with respect to both overall d istribution of origin traffic shares 
and assignment of t he t raffic shares to specific ASes. Despite this diversity, the results 
are qualitatively the same and relatively stable: t he payment change for Tl b varies from 
75% to 105% when only T lb attracts traffic, from 34% to 57% with t he 10 attractors, 
from 18% to 27% with the filtering, and from 7% to 26% with the disconnection. T he 
quantitative outcomes of the traffic attraction are less sensitive to the traffic matrix than 
to the topology. 
3.3 .3.11 Se n sitivity t o p r icing 
To assess the sensitivity of our model to pricing, we consider the same 4 scenarios as 
in section 3.3.3.10 and reduce transit-pricing exponent m from 1 to 0.9, 0.8, 0.75, 07, 06, 
05, and finally 0.4. F igure 3.16 t racks the payment change for attractor T l b and exhibits 
substantial quantitative variations in the outcomes. In the first 3 scenarios, the payment 
change for Tlb remains positive but decreases greatly : from 249% to 25% when T l b is the 
only attractor , from 126% to 14% when the 10 ASes attract traffic, and from 42% to 4% 
with the filtering. W ith t he disconnection by 50% of t he losing customers, t he payment 
change not only decreases as the t ransit -pricing exponent is reduced but also becomes 
negative: the payment change for T l b is 169% form= 1 and - 27% form= 0.4. T he 
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Figure 3.16: Sensitivity of the attractor's payment change to transit pricing. 
payment change becomes O when the transit-pricing exponent is around 0.65. According 
to Telegeography data, the transit-pricing exponent is currently 0.8, 0.73, 0.69, and 0.65 
for Oceania, Asia and South America, Europe, and North America respectively. Thus, 
our results suggest that at least a half of the losing customers needs to disconnect from 
the attractor to eliminate the benefits of the attraction under the current pricing. 
3.3.3.12 Sensitivity to attraction intensity 
While sections 3.3.3.5 through 3.3.3.7 explore how intensive the filtering and dis-
connection should be to negate the benefits of t raffic attraction, we now examine the 
sensitivity of t he attractor's gain to the intensity of attraction. In these experiments 
where only Tlb attracts traffic (as in section 3.3.3.1), Tlb changes its attraction inten-
sity by deaggregating a different number of prefixes announced by its largest customers. 
Specifically, the attractor deaggregates 1, 10, 100, or 1,000 prefixes. Figure 3.17 presents 
the payment change for Tlb. The median payment change is 7%, 30%, 78%, and 108% 
for 1, 10, 100, and 1000 deaggregated prefixes respectively. The marginal utility of the 
attraction intensity diminishes quickly. Even by deaggregating a relatively small number 
of prefixes (e.g., 100 as in the default setting of our studies) the attractor obtains most 
of its maximum possible gain. 
3.3 .3.13 Impact on path lengths 
Finally, we evaluate how the traffic attraction and countermeasures affect the lengths 
of AS-level paths. Figure 3.18 plots the distributions of the AS-level path lengths for 5 
scenarios: (1) baseline without any attraction; (2) attraction by Tlb only, (3) attraction 
by 10 networks as in section 3.3.3.8, (4) with stabilized mult i-stage rational filtering by 
all losing networks as in section 3.3.3.5, and (5) with stage-7 disconnection by losing 
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customers of Tlb as in section 3.3.3.7. The path-length distributions are mostly similar 
to each other. The average path length is 4.4 hops in the baseline scenario. When only 
T lb attracts traffic, paths elongate, with t heir average length increasing to 5.1 hops. The 
attraction by the 10 ASes reduces this elongation , wit h the average path length becoming 
4.8 hops. T he filtering almost restores the path-length distribution of the baseline scenario 
and yields the average path length of 4.5 hops. The disconnection has an opposite effect, 
with the average path length increasing to 5. 7 hops. Overall, t he elongation of paths 
under t raffic attraction is not significant to det er this revenue-increasing behavior. 
3.3.3 .14 Impact on router complexity 
While the traffic attraction via prefix deaggregation can boost t he transit revenue 
of the t ransit ASes, the deaggregation also increases their router memory requirements. 
This section analyzes t he extra router-memory costs imposed by the traffic at traction . 
To assess the memory costs, one needs to understand how IP routers store prefixes. 
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Typically, a BGP-speaking router has BGP RIBs (Adj-RIB-In, Loc-RIB and Adj-RIB-
Out) and Global RIB (all-protocol routing table) [67, 68]. The router inserts the best
paths indicated by Loc-RIB into Global RIB. Global RIB also includes static paths as
well as paths learned from intra-domain routing protocols. For actual forwarding of IP
datagrams, the router uses FIB (Forwarding Information Base) derived from Global RIB.
The router stores BGP RIB in RP (Route Processor card) and FIB in LC (Line Card).
The examined traffic attraction strategy requires storing extra paths per each deag-
gregated prefix in RP and LC. Let q be the number of the more-specific announcements,
φ and ϕ denote the total number of BGP paths that RP and LC respectively can accom-
modate, ρ and % represent the price of RP and LP respectively, and Y refer to the lifetime
of the cards. Then, amortized monthly cost R of storing the extra paths in the router is
R =
q
Y
(
ρ
φ
+
%
ϕ
)
. (3.1)
To quantify the extra router-memory cost R imposed by the prefix deaggregation, we
use φ = 1.5 · 107 and ϕ = 7 · 105 according to [69], ρ = $32K and % = $480K (price of RP
and LC for Juniper T1600 routers [70]), and Y = 60 months (average router lifetime [71]).
While the largest number of more-specific announcements in our experiments is q = 2,000
(i.e., 2 more-specific announcements per each of the 1,000 deaggregated prefixes), the
corresponding extra memory cost for each BGP-speaking router amounts to only $23 per
month. This cost is tiny in comparison to the additional traffic-delivery revenues offered
by the traffic attraction.
While the above analysis shows that the increased memory needs are insignificant as
an economic impediment for the traffic attraction, the prefix deaggregation also increases
the processing load on the routers. Because a transit AS can attract substantial additional
traffic by deaggregating a relatively small number of prefixes, the increased processing is
unlikely to be an effective deterrent against the traffic attraction either. We will analyze
the router processing costs in more detail in our future work.
3.4 Attraction viability
The viability of traffic attraction via prefix deaggregation is a multidimensional issue.
Without pretending to be comprehensive, this section examines the issue from technical,
legal, and business angles.
Technically, it is easy for a transit ASes to deaggregate prefixes. Other ASes can detect
the deaggregation with tools that monitor BGP prefix announcements and IP datagram
flows. While even the detection is not straightforward, the owner of the deaggregated
prefix does not have effective technical means for stopping the traffic attraction, as our
simulations show in the scenarios with prefix filtering and counter-announcing the deag-
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gregated prefixes. While the owners of deaggregated prefixes are in the most legitimate
position to complain, the origin ASes are not the parties most aﬄicted by the traffic
attraction. Besides, because the origin ASes conduct prefix deaggregation themselves for
traffic engineering [72], the argument that intermediary ASes may not do the same for
the same reason becomes weaker.
The aﬄicted parties can try to neutralize the traffic attraction via prefix deaggregation
through litigation. The global nature of the Internet complicates the judicial process
for prefix-deaggregation cases. There seem to be no solid legal grounds for objecting
against the studied deaggregation-based form of traffic attraction. In particular, the
deaggregator and prefix owner can operate under different national legal systems. While
the body of laws governing the Internet is generally slim but growing, we are not aware
of any precedents of prefix-deaggregation litigation. Prior laws and guidelines issued by
various governments for other Internet-related disputes demonstrate that the outcomes
of the legal battles are highly unpredictable. It is not clear whether the contested actions
deviating from an expected Internet behavior will be ruled illegal or legitimate, or even
deserving a special protection by the law.
The business side of the Internet is likely to serve as an important sphere for settling
the traffic attraction tussles. In order to offer the universal Internet connectivity to own
customers, any AS anywhere in the routing hierarchy has to maintain business relation-
ships with other ASes. While different ASes have clearly different negotiation power,
losing a customer or peer is rarely a desirable outcome even for a huge transit ISPs. In
the business world, reputations are tangible assets: a bad reputation can severely dimin-
ish the ability of the ISP to negotiate transit and peering contracts. Hence, if the ISP
community as a whole starts to deem deaggregation-based traffic attraction unacceptable,
the risk of a bad reputation can serve as a strong disincentive for an ISP to boost revenues
through deaggregation-based traffic attraction.
3.5 Related work
Unlike our economic investigation of traffic attraction, prior studies of the subject
approach it mostly from security perspectives [43–45]. Ballani et al. [43] explore the ability
of an AS to attract traffic to itself for either discarding the attracted traffic or delivering
the traffic to the destination. The paper considers 2 different attraction techniques where
the attracting AS announces an invalid path to a prefix: by spuriously claiming to be
either the prefix owner or an intermediary on the invalid path. [43] estimates the feasibility
of such traffic attractions but does not study their economic impact. Nordstrom and
Dovrolis [45] explore various attraction techniques and 2 countermeasures: filtering and
adoption of S-BGP, a secure version of BGP. Again with an exclusive focus on security
rather than traffic economics, [45] concludes that filtering is ineffective and that S-BGP
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is too heavy to get deployed. Goldberg, Schapira, et al. [44] study robustness of S-BGP
and other secure routing protocols to traffic attraction. [44] argues that the secure routing
protocols fail to neutralize traffic attraction and need to be supplemented with defensive
filtering.
Few other prior studies driven by security considerations aim at detecting the prefix
hijacking. Lad, Massey, et al. [52] develop PHAS (Prefix Hijack Alert System), an online
system that notifies the prefix owner when the BGP path to the prefix changes. McArthur
and Guirguis [73] explore stealthy forms of prefix hijacking that attract small amounts
of traffic and thereby avoid detection. Zhang, Zhao, and Wu [74] investigate an attack
where an AS selectively drops BGP announcements to severely disrupt the routing.
There is also related work that includes economic considerations [23, 48, 46, 47, 75].
Gill et al. [46] analyze a game where the financial benefits of traffic attraction serve as
incentives to deploy S-BGP. [46] does not evaluate the economic incentives but simply
use them as a basis for the analyzed S-BGP deployment scenario. Lutu et al. [75] study
whether traffic engineering via prefix deaggregation can reduce the transit expenses of
prefix owners. In contrast, our work evaluates traffic attraction by intermediary ASes
that seek to increase their transit revenues. We consider multiple attractors from different
transit hierarchy and evaluate various countermeasures, such as multi-stage prefix filtering
and link disconnection. Goldberg, Halevi, et al. [23], Levin et al. [47], and Kalogiros
et al. [48] present game-theoretic investigations of economic incentives in inter-domain
routing. While these papers provide thorough analyses for small-scale artificial settings,
we conduct Internet-wide simulations driven by realistic data on inter-domain traffic,
topology, and pricing.
The broader scope and higher realism, combined with the sensitivity studies, enable
our work to yield new insights. For example, while [43] refuses to consider deaggregation-
based attraction because the attractor is presumably unable to deliver the attracted traffic
to the destination, our study demonstrates that the deaggregation-based attraction and
delivery are not only feasible but also highly beneficial for the transit revenues of the
attractor.
3.6 Summary
Relying on the extensive modeling and C-BGP simulations, this chapter presents
an economic perspective on traffic attraction and countermeasures. Motivated by the
insights obtained from the simulation and analysis of a real traffic-attraction incident
of YouTube’s prefix hijacking by Pakistan Telecom, we conducted an in-depth study of
various hypothetical scenarios to understand economic and technical aspects of customer-
traffic attraction by transit providers.
Our work shows that attraction and reaction to it redistribute traffic in the AS-level
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topology and create numerous winners and losers in the AS population. The results
demonstrate that tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3 ASes have significant financial incentives to
attract traffic. In comparison to ASes from the lower tiers, the tier-1 ASes are in a
stronger position to benefit from traffic attraction with respect to: (a) the degree of the
attainable gain, (b) impact on other networks, and (c) preserving their own gain when
multiple ASes attract traffic. The traffic attraction provides the financial gains by pulling
extra traffic from peering links up the transit hierarchy.
The traffic attraction remains effective despite countermeasures unless the participa-
tion by ASes is very broad. Rational filtering does not remove the attraction incentives
even when all losing ASes do the filtering. Only if winning ASes go against their own
financial interests and join the filtering, such cooperative filtering eliminates the financial
benefits of the attractor. The disconnection by losing customers is ineffective unless a large
portion of them terminate their business relationships with the attractor. The increased
router complexity and elongation of paths are too insignificant to be strong deterrents
against the traffic attraction. Our studies of the model sensitivity to the topology, traffic,
and pricing show that the quantitative outcomes are less sensitive to the traffic matrix
than to the topology and pricing; qualitatively, the results remain consistent.
Our work strives to foster a discussion on customer-traffic attraction for revenue gain.
While the financial benefits for the attractors are substantial, the cooperative filtering or
disconnections can negate these benefits only if a very large number of ASes, including
winners participate in the counter-responses. While we do not advocate (or oppose)
traffic attraction, our results raise the possibility that the increasing financial pressure
on IP transit business might prompt transit providers to attract traffic. Also, while the
wide scope and sensitivity analysis make our results fairly generic, no simulation study
can cover the full set of potential behaviors.

Chapter 4
Dissecting the Online Content
Hosting Ecosystem
4.1 Introduction
While the previous chapter examined attraction of customer traffic as a means to
boost revenues of transit providers, this chapter looks at hosting as an alternate source
of revenues for transit providers. Usually, transit ISPs specialize in transit services. But
due to the declining profit margins in the transit sector, transit ISPs start to offer hosting
and content delivery services to earn extra revenues needed to sustain the ISPs’ network
infrastructures. The entrance of transit ISPs into the hosting sector changes the way the
Internet delivers online contents, i.e., from a remote content origination to a localized
distribution from ISPs throughout the transit hierarchy [76]. Hence, this new evolving
trend in hosting is important for understanding the content traffic distribution across the
Internet and geography. The realistic insights from such understanding are valuable for
modeling the Internet-scale content traffic matrix more realistically by including transit
ASes, which were earlier ignored as content traffic sources.
The online content sector is richly financed by online ad revenues. In 2015, the online
ad revenues in the USA totaled up to $59.6 billion (US dollars) [77]. The online contents
rapidly evolved from light-weight text files to dense rich-media and videos. Hence, the
performance levels needed to deliver contents also significantly increased. To minimize
latencies, ad networks and CSPs also widely employ CDNs to cache contents closer to
end users. To cache contents across the Internet, CDNs use third-party network infras-
tructures, e.g., transit ASes. Since transit providers operate global high-speed network
infrastructures managed under one or more ASes with geographically distributed points
of presence (PoPs), the CDNs optimally cache the bandwidth-intensive contents across
geographically distributed PoPs of the transit ASes [76]. In return, the transit providers
earn revenues by using their network infrastructures for hosting online contents, and the
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CDNs and also CSPs and ad networks benefit by saving on the large capital expenditures
for setting up their own global network infrastructures to deliver contents. Besides, the
CDNs also cache online contents on the access ISPs, located at the edge of the Internet.
Such caching, also benefits the access ISPs by reducing their transit costs and CDNs by
supporting higher content throughput.
To explore global content hosting, we use a novel measurement approach that leverages
a VPN to collect real online contents from top 2,165 websites across 52 countries. Next,
using a network of around 22,000 open recursive DNS servers spread across 172 countries
and 8,500 ASes, we discover a vast ecosystem of hosting ASes and CDNs across the
Internet hierarchy and geography. Since online advertisements have been the driving
force behind the immense growth in the online content sector, our study pays special
attention to online ads and classify online contents into ads and regular contents. We also
study qualitative and quantitative differences in hosting characteristics, such as IP address
deployment, content distribution across Internet, and delivery performance between the
two types of contents.
Our analyses of the real measurement data reveal that online contents are widely dis-
tributed across the Internet transit hierarchy and geography. We observe several clusters
of ASes with similar hosting characteristics. While ads are distributed across a large
number of smaller AS clusters, regular contents are distributed across a small number
of bigger AS clusters. These results show trends of replicating ads locally and regular
contents globally. We also observe that the AS clusters have different mixes of ASes from
different tiers, e.g., with more core ASes or edge ASes. AS clusters in their position of
ASes in the transit hierarchy also reflect on their IP address usage, i.e., the IP usage is
the highest for the AS cluster containing the highest number of core ASes and the lowest
in the AS cluster with the highest number of edge ASes. Further, our results reveal most
significant hosting at the intermediate layer of the Internet hierarchy, followed by the
Internet edge and core. Though the aggregate fraction of contents hosted at the core is
smaller, the density of content bytes per AS is the highest at the core. The distributed
hosting across the transit hierarchy reflects in content delivery time; on average 22% of
ads and 62% of regular contents are downloaded within a second from requesting the
web page. Next, we observe that ads use a higher number of IP addresses and more
ASes per website compared to regular contents, suggesting that ads use more servers for
load distribution. As a result, the average latency of 1.6 seconds for ads is lower than
3.5 seconds for regular contents. From an economic perspective, around 60% of ads and
55% of regular contents originate from ASes that have more peering links than transit
links, indicating that more than a half of ad and regular content traffic might incur less
transport costs due to likely routing through peering links.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. Hosting is pervasive throughout the transit hierarchy, including the tier-1 networks.
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Our results confirm the trend towards increasing the number of roles an AS plays 
in the Internet ecosystem. 
2. Ad and regular contents are hosted by significantly different populations of ASes. 
Replication is global for regular content and local for ads. 
3. Reflecting the differences in the hosting AS populations, delivery performance for 
ads and regular contents also differ substantially. While t he initial response to web 
requests is quicker for ads, the download time is lower for regular contents. 
4 .2 M ethodology 
In this section, we describe our methodology for measuring the hosting infrastructures 
and IP addresses used by online contents. First, we collect content data from a set of top 
websites for different countries. Since online ads have been the major source of revenues for 
CSPs, our work also focuses on studying the hosting characteristics of the ads. Therefore, 
we classify online contents into ads and regular contents and analyze qualitative and 
quantitative differences in hosting characteristics between them . By performing Internet-
scale measurements, we discover t he underlying hosting infrastructures and IP address 
usage of online contents. 
4.2.1 D ata collection 
A general aspiration in online advert ising is that users receive ads that are most 
relevant to the m;ers' interest and locations. The users' interests are mostly determined 
by tracking which websites the m;ers visit. The locations are determined from the source 
IP addresses of t he users. Based on these data, ad networks choose to send ads from 
servers near to users' locations. Also, popular CSPs (e.g., Yahoo) host country-specific 
versions of their websites providing unique regular contents specific to the region and 
hosting the contents on nearby infrastructures. 
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In order to collect location-specific ads and regular contents, we use a novel VPN-based
approach to collect online contents from top websites in many countries. Specifically, we
use the VPN service from HMA.com [78] that operates servers in 52 different countries
around the world. Next, we select the top 50 Alexa [79] websites for each of these 52
countries and automate the browsing of all the 50 websites from our data-collecting PC
via a VPN connection to the server in each of the 52 countries, as shown in figure 4.1. Our
novel VPN-based methodology enable us to collect the country-specific online contents
delivered to users in the locations of the VPN presence.
After connecting our PC to a remote VPN server, we retrieve all the hyperlinks on the
landing page of a website using Lynx (Linux-based text browser). Since CSPs use URLs
embedded inside scripts on their websites for fetching ads, videos, and other contents,
and because Lynx does not execute XML, javascript, and flash objects, we employ the
methodology proposed in [80] to collect the embedded URLs of each website. These
hyperlinks are then opened in the Firefox browser configured with Firebug, FireStarter,
and NetExport add-ons. Using the above methodology, we browsed 2,600 websites in
52 countries and collect around 300 GB of HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and
HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) header data from 2,165 websites during
mid-January 2013.
4.2.2 Identifying the ad URLs
A website is a complex collection of contents including third-party contents. The
third parties usually serve ads, Application Program Interfaces (APIs), widgets, etc. to
the websites. To identify the ad URLs in our dataset, we use the filtering rules from the
widely used filtering plugins, such as AdBlock Plus and Ghostery. Using these filtering
rules, we identify around 7,380 ad URLs in our dataset.
4.2.3 Identifying the regular URLs
Identifying regular URLs among third-party URLs is a complicated task. In addition
to ad URLs, websites also contain third-party URLs for widgets and external websites
which the browser plugins do not filter. Intuitively, we can identify the regular URLs of
a website by matching their Second Top-Level Domain (STLD) names with the STLD
of the website’s primary URL, e.g., mail.yahoo.com and www.yahoo.com have common
STLD yahoo.com. On other hand, URLs native to the website also can have STLDs, e.g.,
us.yimg.com, that cannot be straightaway identified by matching the primary STLD. We
refer to such URLs as alternate URLs.
The methodology in [80] relies on the authoritative nameservers to identify the al-
ternate URLs of websites. If any URL on a website shares its authoritative name-
server with the website’s primary URL, then such URL is flagged as a native regular
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URL. This method works for websites that manage their own authoritative nameservers
but fails to distinguish the URLs of websites hosted by third-party hosting providers.
For example, third-party hosting provider Amazon hosts websites www.9gag.com and
www.rockmelt.com and also supplies an authoritative name service for them. The
URL-identification method based on the authoritative nameservers flags all the URLs
of www.9gag.com and www.rockmelt.com as native to both the websites. Besides,
www.9gag.com uses alternate URLs with the d*.cloudfront.net pattern to host static
contents from Amazon’s Cloudfront CDN service. This makes the task of distinguishing
between alternate and third-party URLs on www.9gag.com difficult because the cloud-
front.net STLD is registered and administered by Amazon. Therefore, even a whois query
for this domain name does not reveal the host website of such URLs.
We use a combination of techniques to identify regular and alternate URLs of each
website and separate the third-party URLs of the website. In the following, we describe
our procedure for the regular and alternate URL identification.
Step 1: Matching the STLD. First, we flag a URL as regular if the STLD of the
URL matches the STLD of the website’s primary URL.
Step 2: Verifying the referrer. The URLs left after the previous step are now
subjected to a referrer verification where the URLs that are not referred by the website’s
primary URL are filtered out. This is achieved by checking the Referrer field in the
HTTP request headers. The check filters out most of the third-party URLs referred
by third-party domains. For example, website www.dropbox.com has external links to
several third-party websites such as nytimes.com. Third-party URLs such as css.nyt.com
belonging to nytimes.com can be present in the HTTP data collected for the dropbox.com.
However, the Referrer field of such third-party URLs is nytimes.com. Therefore, third-
party URLs can be filtered out by selecting only those URLs that are referred by the
website’s primary URL.
Step 3: Leveraging the request frequency. While the previous step does not
handle the case where a website refers URLs to multiple third-party websites, the native
STLDs of a website get high request counts compared to third-party STLDs. The fol-
lowing condition separates all the alternate URLs from the website-referred extraneous
URLs. Each STLD i is selected if,
yi · ni > σ (4.1)
where yi is the total request count of STLD i, ni is the total number of URLs with STLD
i, and σ is the standard deviation for the request counts of all the STLDs on the website.
The URLs of the selected STLD i are considered to be regular URLs of a website.
In total, we identified 19,140 regular URLs using the above 3 steps.
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4.3 Discovering the content infrastructure
This section describes how we discover the network resources (i.e., IP addresses,
CNAMEs, and ASes) and hosting-infrastructure geographic footprints of the online con-
tents. The discovery utilizes a network of open recursive DNS vantage points to resolve
each URL in [81]. We start with around 130,000 open recursive DNS servers as glob-
ally distributed vantage points across the Internet. Then, we eliminate around 36,500
DNS servers for reasons such as recursion unavailable (23,000), unreachable (12,500) and
invalid DNS response (1,080).
4.3.1 Eliminating the misleading DNS servers
While small in number, the servers with invalid responses are particularly important to
filter out because of their potentially large negative impact on the measurement accuracy.
We detect DNS servers that inject fake IP addresses during the URL resolution. Two
types of invalid responses are observed. The first type consists of invalid replies for only
particular URLs, such as www.facebook.com and www.youtube.com, and is also observed
in [82, 83]. Invalid responses of the second type come from DNS servers that fail to
resolve a URL or are unwilling to perform DNS recursions. Among the latter, the invalid
IP addresses point to ad-displaying search pages managed by the entities that operate
the misleading DNS servers.
To detect misleading servers of the first type, we send a single DNS query to each
of the 130,000 DNS servers to resolve the primary www.facebook.com URL of Facebook.
The IP address returned by a DNS server is then used to launch a reverse DNS query. The
reverse DNS request to a valid IP address of the www.facebook.com URL should return
a name record containing facebook.com as the STLD. On the other hand, an invalid IP
address yields a name record with an irrelevant STLD. Employing the above method, we
detect around 630 misleading DNS servers. Surprisingly, the largest number of such DNS
servers are hosted in the United States with 417 servers in 15 different ASes. China stood
second with a total of 180 such misleading DNS servers hosted by 32 ASes.
To detect misleading DNS servers of the second type, we send a single DNS query
to resolve a non-existent URL, e.g., pppqqppqqp.com. An open recursive DNS server is
expected to respond to such query with an NXDOMAIN error code. A misleading DNS
server replies with an IP address pointing to an ad-displaying search page. Using this
method, we detect 450 misleading DNS servers hosted across 48 countries and 210 ASes,
bringing the total of eliminated misleading DNS servers to 1,080.
4.3.2 Resolving the URLs using open recursive DNS
After the above filtering steps, we have about 94,000 open recursive DNS servers
spread across approximately 8,500 ASes, 22,040 prefixes, and 172 countries. By selecting
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a single IP address from each prefix, we use around 22,040 DNS servers as vantage points.
Each ad and regular URL is resolved from these vantage points to obtain the CNAMEs
and IP addresses associated with the URL. The DNS resolutions of 19,140 regular and
7,380 ad URLs yield 102,600 and 90,000 IP addresses respectively, with the average of 12
IP addresses per ad URL and 5 IP addresses per regular URL.
4.3.3 IP-to-hosting infrastructure mapping
Finally, the IP addresses obtained in the previous section are mapped to their re-
spective ASes, hosting organizations, and geographyic locations. We utiliz the IP-to-AS
mapping service from [84] to map each IP address to its hosting AS, prefix, registry, and
hosting organization. To map an IP address to its hosting country, we use the GeoIP
tool from MaxMind [85] which is largely accurate on the country level compared to its
city-level and finer resolutions. When possible, we also map each URL of a website to its
CNAME, hosting AS, IP address, prefix, hosting country, registry, and hosting organiza-
tion to form a network-level record of the URL. An URL with multiple IP addresses is
mapped to multiple records. Finally, the total number of ASes discovered for the 19,140
regular and 7,380 ad URLs are 2,177 and 2,272 ASes respectively, and the total number
of host countries are 115 and 134 respectively.
4.4 Measurement results
In this section, we analyze the measurement data to study the hosting infrastructures
with respect to their ASes, CDNs, geography and inter-AS business relations. We also
study top hosting networks and delivery performance for online contents. Our analytic
objective is to understand the online hosting in its relationship with the ISPs across the
transit hierarchy.
4.4.1 Hosting-infrastructure characteristics
Mechanisms for hosting of contents range from centralized to geographically dis-
tributed. To achieve higher performance by minimizing latencies, CSPs and ad networks
distribute their contents across the Internet and geography by collaborating with different
CDNs and ISPs. The consumed network resources, such as IP addresses and ASes, de-
pend on the hosting mechanism. The CDNs mainly leverage the infrastructures of many
ISPs across the Internet to cache contents closer to the end users.
IP address and AS counts. Figure 4.2 presents the cumulative distribution for the
number of IP addresses and AS counts for the ads and regular contents of the examined
websites. Figure 4.2(a) reveals that the ad contents served on the median fraction of
websites use up to 3,000 IP addresses, while the regular contents use only up to 100 IP
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of (a) IP-address count and (b) AS count for the ad and regular 
contents of t he websites. 
addresses. The results suggest that ad contents are distributed across a larger number 
of servers than regular contents. In figure 4.2(b), up to 70% of the websites receive ad 
contents distributed across around 700 ASes and regular contents from about 100 ASes. 
An interesting characteristic is the step increases in the AS counts of the websites. This 
behavior arises because of the presence of different CDNs that host contents according to 
their geographical popularity. The steps indicate clusters of websites hosted by CDNs that 
replicate online contents across multiple ASes as per the websites' geographical popularity. 
Online contents of very popular websites are globally replicated across a large number of 
ASes. T he contents of less popular websites are mostly confined within a continent or 
country, and hosted by a smaller number of ASes. Figure 4.2(b) shows respectively, 4 and 
3 clusters of websites for the ad and regular contents according to the AS count of the 
websites: clusters with 1 to 30 ASes (local hosting), 70 to 100 ASes (regional hosting), 
600 to 1000 ASes (global hosting) for both the ad and regular categories, and the 4th 
cluster with 400 to 500 ASes (continental) hosting for ads. 
Clustering of hosting ASes. Next, we analyze features shared by the hosting ASes. 
While our data are for the top-50 websites in 52 countries, ASes might share hosting 
characteristics such as the number of websites, geographical reach, and number of IP 
addresses. To explore the shared features, we record how many of the popular websites 
each hosting AS serves in each of the countries. Figures 4.3(a) and (b) show these data 
for all the 2,272 ad-hosting ASes and 2,177 regular-hosting ASes on a scatter plot with 
a colored density. Each tile in the above plot represents a hosting AS according to the 
number of websites served in a country. The tile color ranges from white through blue 
to black and signifies the density of ASes that share the respective website count per 
country. The higher the AS density is, the darker the t ile color becomes. 
Figure 4.3{a), shows two distinct clusters Ah and At and four faint clusters At, A i, 
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Figure 4.3: Hosting ASes arranged according to the number of websites served in each 
country: (a) ad-hosting ASes and (b) regular-hosting ASes. 
Aj, Ab of ASes serving ad contents to websites across the countries. On the other hand, 
figure 4.3(b) shows three clusters Rt, Rh and Rb of ASes serving regular contents. Hence, 
while t he ad-hosting ASes form a larger number of smaller clusters, and the regular-
hosting form a smaller number of bigger clusters, the results suggest that ad contents are 
locally replicated to serve regional users and that regular contents are globally replicated 
to cater to users across the Internet. 
Next, we investigate differences between the AS clusters. We focus on four significant 
clusters At, Ah, A1, and Ab of ad-hosting ASes and three clusters Rt, Rh, and Rb of 
regular-hosting ASes. The four ad-hosting clusters comprise of 47, 362, 278, and 1,456 
ASes with t he average number of websites per AS per country equal to 24, 18, 14, and 4 
respectively. The three regular-hosting clusters consist of 103, 759, and 1,252 ASes with 
the average number of websites per AS per country being 15, 11, and 2 respectively. 
IP-address count of AS clusters . Figures 4.4(a) and (b) present the cumulative dis-
tribution of IP addresses for the ad-hosting and regular-hosting AS clusters respectively. 
Clusters Ab and I4 contain the highest fraction, around 40%, of the ASes t hat use a single 
IP address for hosting ad and regular contents. On the other hand, clusters A t and Rt 
employ a large number of IP addresses compared to other clusters: 30% of the ASes in At 
and 60% of the ASes in Rt use more than 100 IP addresses. Interestingly, regular-hosting 
cluster Rh and ad-hosting cluster A1 have a similar profile: around 96% of the ASes in 
cluster A1 are present in cluster R h, which in turn contains about 86% of the ASes in 
cluster Ah, 
Position in the transit hierarchy. Next, we analyze the IP-address distribution for 
each AS cluster with respect to its position in t he transit hierarchy. We use the AS-level 
dataset from Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [56J to categorize the 
ASes into edge, intermediate, and core ASes. Using the CAIDA dataset, we compute 
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative fraction of IP addresses arranged according to the customer cone 
size of: (a) ad-hosting ASes and (b) regular-hosting ASes 
for each AS, the customer-cone metric i.e., the number of direct and indirect transit 
customers of the AS [86]. Based on the studies in [34], we label all the tier-1 ASes as core 
ASes. Those core ASes usually have very large customer-cone values exceeding 20,000. 
Using the method in [87], any AS with t he customer-cone value smaller than 5 is labeled 
as an edge AS. The edge ASes are normally regional ISPs, CSPs, enterprise, or campus 
networks. All the ASes, not labeled as edge and core ASes, are classified as intermediate 
ASes. These ASes are typically operated by tier-2 or t ier-3 ISPs that connect edge ASes 
with core ASes. 
Figures 4.5( a) and (b) present the cumulative fraction of IP addresses arranged ac-
cording to the customer-cone size of the the examined ad-hosting and regular-hosting 
ASes respectively. The fractions of IP addresses used by edge ASes is the highest in 
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Table 4.1: Top 10 ASes arranged according to the number of IP addresses used for hosting
ads and regular contents in clusters Ah and Rt
AS number Organization IPs (regular) IPs (ad) Customer-cone Service (Hierarchy)
20940 Akamai 13,182 11,832 5 CDN (Edge)
4436 GTT (nLayer) 3,513 3,196 975 Transit (Intermediate)
209 CenturyLink 3,054 2,922 20,294 Transit (Core)
3257 GTT (Tinet) 2,725 2,340 24,729 Transit (Core)
7922 Comcast 2,368 2,202 2,164 Access (Intermediate)
1299 TeliaSonera 2,196 2,054 25,753 Transit (Core)
7843 Time Warner 1,603 1,500 932 Access (Intermediate)
1273 Vodafone 1,577 1,346 13,780 Transit (Intermediate)
1239 Sprint 1,167 1,070 22,042 Transit (Core)
5511 Orange 1,073 989 4,431 Transit (Intermediate)
clusters Ab and Rb, followed by clusters Al, Rh, and Ah, and the lowest in clusters At
and Rt. In contrast, the fractions of IP addresses used by intermediate and core ASes are
the highest in clusters At and Rt and lowest in clusters Ab and Rb. This indicates that
the IP-address usage in AS clusters depends on the position of the ASes in the transit
hierarchy.
The IP-address usage in ad cluster Ah and regular-hosting cluster Rt is qualitatively
similar. The total number of IP addresses used by all ASes in clusters Ah and Rt is around
47K and 61K respectively and is the largest among all the clusters. To understand the
close similarity of the IP-address usage between clusters Ah and Rt, we examine which
ASes form these two clusters. The clusters share 50 prominent ASes that collectively
account for around 40K IP addresses. 80% of the ASes are intermediate ASes, followed
by 10% core ASes and 10% edge ASes.
For clusters Ah and Rt, table 4.1 presents the top-10 ASes among these 50 prominent
ASes according to the number of IP addresses, along with the customer-cone size, service,
and hierarchy types of the ASes. The top-10 set consists of 7 transit networks, including
4 core and 3 intermediate ones, 2 access ASes, which are both intermediate, and 1 CDN,
which is an edge hosting AS. The prominent 50 ASes form 14% of the ASes in ad-hosting
cluster Ah. In contrast, regular-hosting cluster Rh contains the other 86% of the ASes
in cluster Ah. Similarly, regular-hosting cluster Rt contains about 85% of the ASes in
ad-hosting cluster At . This reveals a big difference from cluster Rt: while Rt contains
the prominent 50 ASes, At does not. In ad-hosting cluster At which collectively accounts
for 21K IP addresses, 5 prominent ASes consisting of Google (AS 15169) and 4 large
transit ASes: NTT (AS 2914), Level3-GBLX (AS 3549), Deutsche Telekom (AS 3320),
and Telecom Italia (AS 6762) contribute up to 81% of the total IP addresses that serve
the ad contents.
Clusters Ab and Rb, where edge ASes predominantly contributed IP addresses, also
50 
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative distribution of the customer-cone size of: ( a) ad-hosting ASes and 
(b) regular-hosting ASes. 
display qualitatively similar IP usage across the Internet hierarchy and collectively account 
up to 18K and 21K IP addresses respectively. In both clusters, Amazon (AS 16509) and 
Microsoft (AS 8075) are the 2 ASes with the largest IP count. While Akamai (AS 16625), 
CDNetworks (AS 36408), and Amazon (AS 14618) are the next top ASes in ad cluster 
Ab, China Telecom (AS 4134), China Unicom (AS 4837), CDNetworks (AS 36408) are 
the next top ASes in regular-hosting cluster Rb with respect to the IP-address count. 
Transit hierarchy in the clusters. F igures 4.6(a) and (b) plot the cumulative distri-
bution of the customer-cone size of the ASes in all ad-hosting and regular-hosting clusters 
respectively. Both ad and regular contents are hosted by ASes from across the Internet 
hierarchy. The fraction of edge ASes varies from 18% in cluster Rt to 44% in cluster Rh, 
and up to 72% in cluster Rb, as shown in figure 4.6(b) . F igure 4.6(a) depicts a qualita-
tively similar trend for the ad-hosting clusters. The fraction of edge ASes is the smallest 
for cluster At and increases in clusters Ah, At, and Ab. Complementing the fraction of 
edge ASes, the fractions of intermediate and core ASes follow the opposite trend. While 
Rt contains 75% intermediate and 7% core ASes, Rb has 27.7% intermediate and 0.3% 
core ASes. The above results show that the AS clusters preserve the transit-hierarchy 
positions of their ASes. 
Websites hosted on the AS clusters. Figures 4.7(a) and (b) plot t he number of 
websites served by the ad-hosting and regular-hosting clusters respectively, arranged ac-
cording to the number of IP addresses on the website. The IP-address counts of the 
websites correlate highly with the AS position in the transit hierarchy. The clusters con-
sisting mostly of core and intermediate ASes use a larger number of IP addresses per 
website. For example, Ah and Rt use more IP addresses per website than Ab and Rb. In 
contrast to the IP count of the websites, the website count of the clusters has a reverse 
dependence on the transit-hierarchy position: while clusters Ah, Ai and Ab serve 757, 780, 
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Figure 4.7: Number of websites served by: (a) ad-hosting clusters and (b) regular-hosting 
clusters, arranged according to the number of IP addresses per website. 
and 1,057 websites respectively, clusters Rt, Rh, and Hi> serve 484, 722, and 977 websites 
respectively. Cluster At is an exception from this trend and serves 925 websites. In all 
4 ad-hosting clusters, www.yahoo.com and www.msn.com are the 2 websites that receive 
ads from the largest number of IP addresses. In clusters Rt and Rh, www.weather.com 
and www.msn.com have the highest IP address counts. In cluster Rb, www.bing.com and 
www.lemonde.fr are the websites with the largest number of IP addresses. 
The above results can be summed up as follows: 
1. Ads use higher numbers of IP addresses and AS counts per website than regular 
contents, suggesting that ads use a higher number of servers to distribute the load 
more broadly. 
2. While ad-hosting ASes form a larger number of clusters, the clusters of regular-
hosting ASes are larger in size, indicating that replication is global for regular con-
tents and local for ads. 
3. Clusters with a majority of ASes from a higher tier of the t ransit hierarchy serve 
more websites per AS per country and employ a larger number of IP addresses per 
website. 
4. The fractions of core, intermediate, and edge ASes in the clusters vary for different 
clusters, demonstrating that AS clusters reflect the hierarchical positions of their 
ASes. 
5. With a single exception, clusters from a higher tier of the transit hierarchy serve a 
smaller number of websites. 
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Table 4.2: Top 10 ASes arranged according to the bytes served for ads and regular contents
Regular content ad content
Organization AS number Bytes (%) Organization AS number Bytes (%)
EdgeCast 15133 10.5 Google 15169 24.0
Akamai 20940 5.2 EdgeCast 15133 4.2
Level 3 3356 3.3 Akamai 20940 2.8
Wikimedia 43821 3.3 Amazon 16509 2.7
Microsoft 8075 1.7 Level 3 3356 1.3
NTT 2914 1.6 NTT 2914 1.2
China Telecom 4134 1.5 NetVision 1680 1.2
CDNetworks 36408 1.3 UAB Hostex 47205 1.2
Amazon 16509 1.3 Telia 1299 1.2
China Unicom 4837 1.2 fibre one 24961 1.0
4.4.2 Byte volume and location of contents
Now, we study the hosted contents in regard to their byte volume and location.
Top content-hosting ASes. In this section, we consider ASes individually without
clustering. We estimate the volume of bytes hosted by the ASes as follows. First, we
compute the total bytes served from each URL. Then, we uniformly distribute the URL’s
total bytes among all the IP addresses of the URL. Finally, we aggregate the bytes as-
sociated with the IP addresses to determine the content volumes of the ASes. Table 4.2
presents the top-10 ASes arranged according to the fraction of bytes delivered for ads and
regular contents. These top-10 ASes contribute up to 31% of all regular-content bytes and
41% of all ad bytes. AS 15133 operated by EdgeCast serves 10.5% of the total regular-
content bytes, which is the largest in our dataset, and predominantly hosts contents for
websites such as Pinterest, Twitter, and WordPress. Google serves up to 24% of the total
ad bytes in our dataset.
Top CDNs. Table 4.3 presents the top 5 ad-hosting and regular-hosting CDNs in
our measurements. Akamai is the biggest CDN for regular contents, serving 34% of the
websites containing 27% of the total regular-content bytes. It serves 5% of the regular-
content bytes from its flagship AS 20940 and other 22% from more than 700 third-party
ASes. Unlike Akamai, EdgeCast serves all content bytes from its servers located across
the Internet and managed under its single flagship AS 15133. For ads, Google serves
61% of the websites and 29% of the total ad bytes in our dataset. Google’s ads are split
between its primary AS 15169, which serves 24% of the total ad bytes, and more than
400 third-party ASes, which serve the remaining 5% of the total ad bytes.
Content in the transit hierarchy. Next, we assess the fractions of byte volumes
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Figure 4.8: Fraction of online content bytes hosted by the ASes according to (a) customer-
cone size; and (b) peering coefficient. 
hosted by core, intermediate, and edge ASes. Figure 4.8(a) shows t hat nearly 33% of the 
ad bytes and 40% of the regular-content bytes are hosted by edge ASes which constitute 
55% and 59% of the total 2,272 ad and 2,177 regular ASes respectively. The core ASes 
host roughly 4% of ad and 6% regular-content bytes, which is significant because there 
are only 12 such ASes. Intermediate ASes host the remaining 63% of ad and 54% of 
regular-content bytes. Though the content volume is the lowest in the core, the volume 
density is the highest for the core ASes and equals 0.5% for ads and 0.3% for regular 
contents. Both ad and regular-content density per AS approximately equals 0.06% for 
intermediate ASes and 0.03% for edge ASes. 
Byte volume vs. business relationships. To understand the relation between t he 
hosted content volumes and business profiles of the ASes, we compute the peering ratio 
for each AS, defined as the number of peering links divided by the number of transit 
links. To compute peering ratios, we use the inter-AS relationship datasets from CAIDA 
and UCLA [59], which are similar in the number of t ransit links and largely different in 
the number of peering links. A peering ratio less t han 1 implies that an AS has more 
transit links and less peering links. A large transit AS has a large number of transit 
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Figure 4.9: Distribution for t he number of hosting countries with respect to: (a) fraction 
of ASes and (b) fraction of hosted bytes. 
Table 4.4: Top-10 hosting countries ranked by the AS counts and fractions of the hosted 
bytes. 
Regular content ad content 
Ranking by AS count Ranking by bytes Ranking by AS count Ranking by bytes 
Country AS count Country Bytes(%) Country AS count Country Bytes(%) 
USA 511 USA 38.6 USA 558 USA 47.8 
UK 109 etherlands 4.1 Germany 110 Ireland 4.8 
Germany 102 China 3.9 UK 108 Germany 3.6 
Russia 96 Russia 3.0 Russia 93 UK 2.9 
Japan 84 France 2.8 Japan 76 Denmark 2.8 
France 71 Germany 2.2 France 66 Russia 2.7 
Canada 59 Estonia 2.1 Netherlands 61 Israel 1.9 
Australia 54 UK 2.0 Canada 61 Lithuania 1.9 
Singapore 49 Sweden 1.9 Poland 52 Japan 1.7 
Poland 49 Poland 1.7 Australia 51 Austria 1.7 
customers and relatively small number of peers. Therefore, the peering ratio of large 
t ransit ASes is below 1. Small ASes have a peering ratio above 1 because t hey peer 
extensively to reduce t heir transit costs [5, 6]. Figure 4.8(b) presents the distribution of 
ad and regular-content bytes hosted by ASes in relation to peering ratio of t he ASes. 
In both CAIDA and UCLA datasets, around 60% of ads and 55% of regular contents 
originate from ASes with a peering ratio greater than 1. Thus, using these fractions 
together with the previous results for fractions of byte volumes hosted by intermediate 
ASes, we can derive the specific fraction of byte volumes hosted by intermediate ASes 
wit h a peering ratio below and above 1 to be 36% and 27% for ads respectively, and 39% 
and 15% for regular contents respectively. These specific results are useful for modeling 
a content traffic matrix which considers inter-AS business relationships. 
4.4. Measurement results 
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F igure 4.10: Delivery performance for regular contents and ads: (a) response times (b) 
Download times. 
Geographic locations of contents. Figure 4.9(a) plots the cumulative fraction of 
hosting ASes in regard to the hosting countries. For both ad and regular contents, the 
top-10 countries ranked by the AS counts account for about 54% of t he hosting ASes. 
Figure 4.9(b) demonstrates that the top-10 countries ranked by t he fraction of hosted 
bytes account for around 62% for regular contents and 72% for ads. Table 4.4 shows that 
the sets of top-10 hosting countries are substantially different for the two metrics: the 
countries with a smaller number of ASes and higher byte volumes host popular CSPs, 
such as Google and Yahoo. The above results might help an ISP to decide in which 
country to deploy its infrastructure. 
4.4.3 Content delivery performance 
While the previous studies characterize content host ing across t he transit hierarchy 
and geography, we now examine delivery performance for the hosted contents. 
The end users, publishers, and advertisers are interested in t he contents to be delivered 
as promptly as possible. We measure response and download times for regular contents 
and ads. 
Response times. Figure 4.lO(a) plots the distribution of response t imes for ads and 
regular contents. The profiles for both types of contents are qualitat ively similar up to 
response times around 100 ms and diverge beyond that point. The 90th percentile of 
response times for ads and regular contents are 1.6 seconds and 3.5 seconds respectively. 
The smaller content size and more local hosting are likely reasons for the faster responses 
to ad requests. 
Download times. The download time of a content is the time between requesting its 
webpage and arrival of the content. This time depends on the priority given to the content 
in regard to the other contents of the webpage. Figure 4. lO(b) presents the distribution of 
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the download times for all ads and regular contents. The 90th percentile of the download
times for regular and ad contents are 4 and 12 seconds respectively, suggesting that a
majority of ads arrive long after regular contents. Also, nearly 22% of ads and 62% of
regular contents are downloaded within one second of requesting the web page. Hence,
ads have smaller response times and larger download times. One plausible reason is a
lower priority given to ad requests on a majority of the websites.
4.5 Discussion: Economic impact of Internet advertising
Over the last 2 decades, entrepreneurs leveraged the growing Internet to provide vari-
ous web-based services, such as online banking, shopping, and search. The new Internet-
enabled electronic marketplace attracted numerous advertisers, thereby bringing billions
of revenues. In return, the financing of the online contents by the online advertisers drove
the Internet infrastructures growth and content-hosting innovation, indirectly contributed
to transforming the Internet from a transit hierarchy towards a flat mesh of peering links,
and also fueled inter-ISP relationship disputes and debates over net-neutrality [88–90].
Internet infrastructure growth: Millions of individuals and enterprises produce
websites to earn ad revenues. The demand for website hosting brings thousands of en-
tities into the hosting business. [91] reveals that the hosting-provider population grows
with a factor 1.97 since January 2002. While the web traffic constitutes 52% of all Inter-
net traffic [60], the transit ISPs invest heavily into upgrading their network capacity to
accommodate the swelling traffic. The international Internet capacity nearly quadrupled
from 24 Tbps in 2009 to 104 Tbps in 2013 [92].
Impact on transit prices: The increasing demand for higher network capacities
and advancements in network technologies fueled intense competition in transit markets
and persistently reduced transit prices [92]. As transit and access ISPs experienced a
decreasing Return on Investment (ROI), many of them overhauled their business models
to cope with the new market realities. Supported by ad revenues, content hosting proved
more profitable than relying only on transit services. Many incumbent transit providers,
such as Level 3 and Cogent, started their own CDN businesses and collaborated with
many ad networks and popular content providers, e.g., Netflix.
Impact on inter-AS business relationships: Traditionally, the inter-AS business
relationships were mostly limited to transit and peering. The augmented content hosting
and caching created a need for several new types of inter-AS economic relations, such as
paid peering, partial transit, and remote peering, to deal with increasing heterogeneity in
business profiles and geographic footprints of ASes.
Business relationships and net-neutrality disputes: The entrance of transit
ISPs into content hosting payed way for several inter-ISP business relation disputes in
the Internet. Generally, it is very uncommon for access ISPs to be transit customers of
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CSPs. On the other hand, CSPs usually pay access ISPs either through paid-peering
or partial-transit relationships. Due to content hosting by transit ISPs, the access ISPs
that buy transit connections from such transit ISPs dispute their relationships because of
content traffic originating from the transit ISPs, e.g., Level 3 vs. Comcast dispute [93].
Also, large access ISPs demand payments from remote CSPs in return for providing
premium quality of service (QoS) to the content traffic, e.g., Google vs. Free dispute [94],
or otherwise degrade the content traffic performance by not allocating sufficient network
capacities [17]. These developments fuel debates on net neutrality, an informal code for
transport networks to treat all the Internet traffic equally without discriminating on the
basis of content, application, site, and protocol.
Potential revenue source for access ISPs: Recently, few UK-based ISPs have
trialed an ad-sponsored 3G Internet access to heavily subsidize the monthly subscription
fee to as low as $0 per month [95, 96]. In this model, the advertisers pay the ISP for
displaying ads to end users. The ad revenues might help the ISP to partly recover the
costs and also enable it to provide affordable Internet access, thereby attracting more end
users.
4.6 Related work
Online contents were the focus of many research works. [97,98,80,99] examined web-
based contents and services along with their features such as content types, number of
requests, bytes, and servers. [81, 100, 101] carried out measurement-based studies of real
operational CDNs. A common focus is on few selected CDNs. [102, 103] explored the
footprints of hosting infrastructures across the Internet and geography via real measure-
ments relying on either volunteers [102] or traffic traces [103]. Our work uses a simple,
and yet novel, VPN-based approach to collect online contents and then discover their
hosting infrastructures from a large number of geographically distributed DNS servers.
We detected a large ecosystem of hosting infrastructures, including those invisible from
a large portion of the Internet. We also studied differences in hosting of ads versus reg-
ular contents. Unlike the previous studies that derive conclusions from meta data such
as the number of served URLs, we measure byte volumes to characterize hosting more
accurately.
Recently, few works explored content delivery performance for ad traffic. [104] ana-
lyzed delivery of ads with a focus on effectiveness of ad blocking. [105] charted 3 prominent
ad networks and evaluated their latency and effectiveness of user targeting. [106] charac-
terized mobile ad traffic using data collected in an operational ISP to study the traffic
frequency, content types and energy implications for mobile devices. That work also
briefly glimpsed into the hosting infrastructures of ad contents. Our work distinguishes
itself from the above by collecting contents from the top 2,165 websites in 52 countries
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to characterize their hosting infrastructures. Our work also explicitly compares hosting
properties for ads versus regular contents.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we explore online content hosting and the role of transit ISPs in
it. We analyze the hosting infrastructures with respect to their IP resources, positions
in the transit hierarchy, geographic locations, and user-perceived delivery performance.
We classify online contents into ads and regular contents and study differences in their
hosting. Using a novel VPN-based measurement approach, we collect ads and regular
contents from the top 2,165 websites in 52 countries. Our characterization of hosting
infrastructures utilizes a vast network of open recursive DNS vantage points spread across
8,500 ASes and 172 countries.
Our analyses reveal that content hosting is pervasive throughout the transit hierarchy,
including the tier-1 networks. Our results confirm the trend towards an increasing number
of roles an AS plays in the Internet ecosystem. We observe that ads and regular contents
are hosted by significantly different populations of ASes. While replication is global for
regular contents, ads are locally replicated. Reflecting the differences in the hosting AS
populations, performance for ads and regular contents also differs substantially. While
responses to individual content requests are quicker for ads, the download time is lower for
regular contents of a webpage. Our measurement data and analytic results are valuable
for deriving a realistic matrix for content traffic, where transit ISPs are included as sources
of content traffic.
Chapter 5
An ad-based Revenue Model for
Access ISPs
5.1 Introduction
While chapter 4 shows that transit ISPs broadly rely on content hosting as a source
of extra revenues, this chapter analyzes a model where access ISPs derive revenues from
online ads.
The demand for Internet access by residential users is increasing and driven mainly by
unlimited availability of online contents. A majority of the CSPs that offer free online con-
tents derive their revenues from online ads. By financing the CSPs, the ads indirectly in-
centivize technological advancements in content development and hosting. Because online
ads provide the CSPs with higher revenues when the consumption of the online contents
is higher, the CSPs have incentives to create more advanced and innovative online con-
tents, delivery of which might require significant network capacities. As chapter 4 reveals,
the CSPs widely collaborate with different CDNs and transit ISPs to cache bandwidth-
intensive contents across the transit hierarchy. On other hand, end users demand faster
Internet access to experience a good quality of browsing the bandwidth-intensive contents.
To satisfy the growing demand for faster Internet access and to sustain increasing traffic
volumes, access ISPs have to periodically upgrade their network capacities.
The network upgrades are usually expensive, and the access ISPs are vocal about their
rising network costs. To recover the costs of upgrading and operating their networks, the
access ISPs monthly charge subscription fees to end users. The two most common billing
models for access ISPs are usage-based and flat-rate billing [107, 108]. In usage-based
billing, the users are charged according to the consumed traffic volume. With flat-rate
billing, the access ISPs charge fixed monthly fees regardless of the consumed traffic. Due
to intense competition in the access market, a majority of access ISPs have gravitated
from the usage-based to flat-rate billing [109]. Unlike the flat rate for revenues, the costs
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of the access ISPs depend on the peak traffic rates.
With the flat-rate revenues and usage-based costs, access ISPs find themselves in a
difficult economic situation [1]. Responding to the challenge, many access ISPs adopt
a combination of flat-rate and usage-based billing, i.e., by introducing data caps [110].
In the data-cap model, a user pays a fixed monthly fee but if the consumed traffic ex-
ceeds a monthly quota, the Internet access is either throttled to a lower speed or ter-
minated altogether until the end of the billing cycle. Alternatively, large access ISPs
demand financial compensation from popular CSPs for the costs of delivering the CSPs’
bandwidth-intensive contents [111]. Meanwhile, some CSPs collaborate with access ISPs
to subsidize end users subscriptions [112]. These initiatives trigger concerns about net
neutrality [19,20]. On the other hand, because transit ISPs increasingly host online con-
tents, access ISPs also demand financial compensation from such transit networks [21].
While online ads proved to be a rich source of revenues, this chapter analyzes a model
where an access ISP exploits online ads to earn extra revenues. We assess the revenue
potential and economic viability of the ad-based model for access ISPs with different
customer bases. While end users are sensitive to their subscription costs, this chapter
also studies the utility of the ad-based revenue model for the end users. In the considered
model, an access ISP directly collaborates with advertisers to display ads to end users
without engaging CSPs. The ads are displayed in a dedicated space in the browser.
Technical details of displaying the ads are discussed later in the chapter. We investigate
the following questions about the ad-based revenue model:
1. What is the revenue potential of this model for differently sized access ISPs under
current market prices of online ads?
2. What is the target ad revenue and per-unit price needed to offset the access ISP’s
network costs?
3. What is the maximum number of ads that an access ISP can display to the end
users without degrading the quality of their browsing experience, and what is the
ad revenue potential on this advertising level?
4. What are the incentives that an access ISP can offer to its ad-subsidized Internet
subscribers?
We evaluate our model using financial data from one large and one medium-sized
access ISPs operating in India. Our analysis shows a significant revenue potential of
around 50% of the capital expense for large access ISP which serves millions of Internet
subscribers. For the medium-sized access ISP which has tens of thousands of end users,
the ad revenue potential is about 5% of its capital expense. Under the current Cost-
Per-Mille (CPM) prices for ads and typical time spent by end users on the Internet, our
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analyses reveal that the ad-based revenue model is economically viable for access ISPs.
The ad revenues enable access ISPs to offer up to 6–9 MBps of additional access speed
or 12–20 GB additionally consumed data as incentives for users to subscribe for an ad-
subsidized plan. Also, we conduct a market survey of user interests in subscribing to
ad-subsidized Internet plans. Our survey reveals that a significant majority of users are
interested in trying this option.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we briefly discuss practicality of
ad-subsidized Internet plans. The model implementation and user-utility formulation are
presented in section 5.3. Section 5.4 reports the data collected for evaluating the model.
Section 5.5 analyzes the revenue potential and economic viability of the model and also
assesses the user incentives. Section 5.6 briefly discusses prior works, and section 5.7
summarizes the chapter.
5.2 Background
Generally, Internet users detest online ads because many poorly designed ads hinder
the browsing experiences by floating and rolling across the screen or auto-playing audio-
video files without an explicit consent from the users. However, online ads enable CSPs
to serve online contents freely, making the Internet popular among residential users. Re-
cently, few access ISPs have started to insert pop-up ads into browsers by tampering with
content traffic without a user consent, triggering security and privacy concerns [113].
The considered ad-based revenue model gives users an explicit choice by offering trans-
parent access plans subsidized by ad revenues. The users who choose to receive ads benefit
from extra speed or data cap incentives. This model allows ISPs to earn ad revenues with
an explicit consent of the user. To display ads, the ISPs provide mandatory plugins to
be installed on browsers by the ad-subsidized Internet subscribers. The browser plug-
ins create a dedicated space within the browser window, e.g., a horizontal or vertical
panel at the window edge. The plugins periodically fetch ads from ad servers of the ISP
or an ad network, and display the ads in this dedicated space. The model allows the
users to control the number and frequency of received ads. To make the model robust
to misuses, disabling or tampering with the browser plugins automatically disconnects
the ad-subsidized subscriber from the Internet. While security and privacy aspects of the
model are clearly important, their detailed study is a topic for future work.
Another important question is whether end users are willing to adopt ad-subsidized
plans. Hence, we conduct a survey (https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/8BQ8TNN) by
posing the following 3 questions to more than 100 residential users:
Q1: If your ISP proposes you to sign up for a new Internet plan that is cheaper or
has faster speed or provides more data than your existing Internet plan, but comes with
non-intrusive online ads sent by the ISP, would you sign up?
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Figure 5.1: Responses of the survey: ( a) questions Ql and Q2 and (b) question Q3. 
Q2: If receiving more ads brings you more discounts in t he form of a smaller price or 
speed increase or data-limit increase, would you be interested in receiving more ads? 
Q3: If you decide to sign up for a new ad-sponsored Internet plan, which one of the 
following will be your primary criterion to migrate from your current plan to the new 
plan: cheaper price, higher speed, or more data? 
Figure 5.1 presents the survey results. For question Ql, 76% of the respondents 
express willingness to try an ad-subsidized Internet plan, either unconditionally or after a 
trial. Around 20% of the respondents are not interested in an ad-subsidized plan. Though 
the fraction of disinterested users increases by 16% in question Q2, 62% of the responses 
are positive. For question Q3, 57% of the respondents prefer a higher speed, another 14% 
opt for price discounts, and 11 % are interested in data-cap upgrades. The above results 
clearly substantiate an interest of residential users in ad-subsidized Internet plans. 
Last but not least, the ad-based revenue model for access ISPs lessens concerns about 
net neutrality in comparison to direct sponsorship by CSPs. Direct payments by CSPs 
to ISPs are viewed problematic because prominent CSPs might use them to obtain pref-
erential delivery of their online contents. In the ad-based revenue model, ISPs make no 
agreements with CSPs and deal directly with advertisers or ad networks only. 
5.3 Model 
5.3.1 Ad revenue potential 
Let n be the number of Internet users served by an access ISP, and let t be the 
average number of minutes spent by the users daily on the Internet. Let CPM denote 
the Cost-per-Mille market price of ads. Whereas the access ISP periodically sends ads 
to the users, we use f a measured in impressions per minute to denote the frequency of 
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Table 5.1: Notations used for deriving the users-utility function.
Notations Description
U Utility of a user
h Higher traffic speed
dh Data cap for the higher speed
l Throttled speed after the data cap is exhausted
dl Data cap for the throttled speed
P Monthly fee of the Internet plan
p Per-unit price
the ad impressions per user. Then the average ad revenue per user (AARPU) per month
(assumed to last 30 days) is:
ra = 30 · t · fa · ca (5.1)
where ca = CPM/1000 is the cost of a single ad impression.
Then, the total ad revenue potential for an access ISP serving the n users is expressed
as:
Ra = n · ra. (5.2)
Instead of using the market-driven CPM prices, the access ISP can set its own ad
price to reflect its network cost. We model such ad price CPMISP as a function of its
capital expenditure Ec:
CPMISP =
1000 · Ec
30 · t · fa · n. (5.3)
5.3.2 Utility of the users
A majority of the access ISPs around the world employ the data-cap billing
model [110]. As discussed in section 5.1, the data-cap billing model involves higher traffic
speed h provided until monthly data cap quota dh is consumed, after which the speed is
throttled to lower rate l until the end of the billing cycle. Data cap dl for the throttled
speed depends on the number of days between the throttling moment and next billing
cycle. Usually, access ISPs offer multiple tariff plans with different combinations of traf-
fic speeds and data caps for different monthly fees P . Table 5.1 sumps up the model
notations.
We model the utility of a user as a standard alpha-fair function [108]. The user derives
a utility equivalent to the monthly fee of the selected Internet tariff. The utility with the
higher and throttled speed respectively is captured by:
Uh = ah · (1− α)−1 (h · dh)(1−α) − (p · h · dh) (5.4)
Ul = al · (1− β)−1 (l · dl)(1−β) − (p · l · dl) (5.5)
where α = β = 0.5 denote the price sensitivity of the utility functions, constants ah and
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Table 5.2: Monthly average financial data as of March 31, 2015 for 2 Indian access ISPs.
Parameters Notation Units Access ISP
Airtel DEN
Service type – – DSL Cable
Users n Thousand 1508 23
Revenue R Million Rs. 1560 17.25
ARPU ru Rs. 1034 750
OpEx Eo Million Rs. 2195 45.96
CapEx Ec Million Rs. 422 57.16
al represent the users utility levels for per-unit price p, speed limits h and l, and data
caps dh and dl. After solving Uh
′ = 0 and Ul′ = 0, we express ah and al as follows:
ah = p · (h · dh)α , al = p · (l · dl)β . (5.6)
Per-unit price p is derived by computing the weighted average of monthly fee P pro-
portionally to traffic speeds h and l and data caps dh and dl:
p =
P
h · dh + l · dl . (5.7)
Finally, the aggregate utility of a user for any billing month is:
U = Uh + Ul. (5.8)
5.4 Data
We instantiate the model with real financial data of 2 prominent access ISPs in India.
Financial data of access ISPs, such as average monthly revenues, operational expenses
(OpEx), and capital expenses (CapEx) are often treated as confidential records. Nev-
ertheless, few ISPs publish these data in their annual financial reports. We use annual
reports of the two considered ISPs to obtain the financial information. Unlike the revenues
separated into mobile, DSL, and other service types, the expenditures are published with-
out breaking them into service segments. Therefore, our work utilizes the consolidated
CapEx of each access ISP as a baseline for the ISP’s network costs.
5.4.1 Financial data of access ISPs
Airtel [114] and Den Networks [115] are the 2 access ISPs in our study. Airtel is a large
access ISP serving millions of users. Den is a medium-sized access ISP with thousands
of users. Table 5.2 presents their financial data for March 2015. The revenues and costs
in this chapter are quoted in Indian Rupees (Rs.). During the time of validation of this
model, Rs. 66 was equal to 1 US dollar.
For each ISP, we collect the number of retail Internet users, average revenue per user
(ARPU), and corresponding service type. The monthly average revenue of the ISP for
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Table 5.3: CPM prices received by a popular Indian entertainment website.
Year-Month CPM (Rs.)
2015-06 68.25
2015-05 52.65
2015-04 85.8
2015-03 86.45
2015-02 85.15
2015-01 86.45
Table 5.4: Ad revenue potential of the 2 access ISPs with t = 60 minutes and fa = 1
impression/minute.
CPM Units Ad revenue potential
Airtel DEN
CPMmax Million Rs. 235 3.5
CPMavg Million Rs. 210 3.2
CPMmin Million Rs. 143 2.2
a service type is computed by multiplying the ARPU and total number of users of the
corresponding service, i.e., R = n · ru. Due to unavailability of the expenditure data for
individual service types, we use the monthly consolidated Capex and OpEx which might
include expenses of enterprise and other non-retail Internet services of the ISP. The OpEx
values are computed by subtracting revenue R from EBITDA (Earning Before Interest,
Tax, Depreciation and Amortization) published in the financial report.
5.4.2 Ad pricing data
The prices of online ads depend on the advertisers’ budget and their willingness to pay.
Also, the ad agencies can set different minimum starting prices of ads in different pricing
models, such as CPM and CPC, and different formats, such as banner and video. This
work uses real CPM prices of ads received by TellyReviews, a popular weekly entertain-
ment website that hosts weekly reviews and updates of popular Indian TV shows [116].
During the time of this study, the website attracted on average 591,000 visitors and 1.6
million page views per month and received display-ads from 4 ad agencies, such as Wor-
dAds, AdSense, Gravity, and OnClickAds. Table 5.3 shows the CPM prices received by
the website during the 6 months from January to June 2015. The maximum, average,
and minimum CPM prices over this period are CPMmax = Rs. 86.45, CPMavg = Rs.
77.35, and CPMmin = Rs. 52.65 respectively.
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5. 5 Analysis 
5.5.1 Ad r evenue potential 
We estimate t he ad revenue potential for Airtel and Den using equality 5.2. According 
to (117], the global average t ime spent per day by a user on the Internet is t = 60 minutes. 
With t he impression frequency of 1 ad per minute, the revenue potential wit h CPMmax is 
estimated to be around Rs. 235 million and Rs. 3.5 million for Airtel and Den respectively. 
Table 5.4 presents the ad revenue potential of t he 2 ISPs with CPMavg and CPMmin· 
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shows that Airtel's ad revenue potential ranges within 9- 15% of its average revenue, 7-
11 % of its OpEx, and 34- 56% of its CapEx. For Den, its revenue potential is 4% of its 
CapEx and 20% of its average revenue with C P Mmin and CPMmax respectively. 
While the above analysis assumes that all users spend online the same average time, 
this time actually varies across the users. Due to the lack of real data on the online 
time of the users, we employ several well-known synthetic distributions, such as normal, 
log-normal, and Zipf-Mandelbrot distributions, to represent the online times. Various 
reports published by telco operators and market-research firms estimate the average online 
time of Indian users to be between 20 and 360 minutes per day [118, 119,117,120]. We 
conservatively choose the online t ime to range between 20 and 120 minutes per day, so 
that t he average online time is 60 minutes in all the 3 distributions. 
Figure 5.3 presents the ad revenue potential of each ISP relative to its CapEx with 
3 CPM prices and 3 distributions of online t imes. The plot also depicts the ad revenue 
potential when the online time kept at 60 minutes per day for all users. Except for Zipf-
Mandelbrot distribution for Airtel, the ad revenue potential are qualitatively similar when 
the online times are constant or vary. The ad revenue potential as a percentage of the 
CapEx of Airtel varies from 7% at the lowest CPM price of Rs. 10 to 56% at the highest 
CP M price of Rs. 100. 
The above analysis indicates a tangible revenue potential for access ISPs, particularly 
for Airtel-like large access ISPs. While a large user base is advantageous, small access 
ISPs can earn non-trivial ad revenues. 
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Figure 5.5: CPM variation for Den Networks for different average online times and dif-
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Figure 5.6: Ad revenues as a percentage of CapEx for different ad frequencies. 
5.5.2 Economic viability of the ad-based revenue model 
As ads are periodically displayed independently of the number of page views, the 
average online time of the users is a key parameter of our model. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 plot 
the ISP-selected CPM prices for Airtel and Den respectively as the average online time 
varies to cover a certain percentage of the CapEx. 
In figure 5.4, we set CPMavg = Rs. 77.35, t = 60 minutes, ad frequency fa = 1 
ad per minute as baselines. In order to earn ad revenues equivalent to 100% of Airtel's 
CapEx, the ISP-selected CPM price is Rs. 155. On the other hand, if CPMJSp is equal 
to market average price CPMavg, then the average online time should be around 121 
minutes. At present, these settings are not economically feasible because the ISP-selected 
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Table 5.5: Speed and data prices offered by Airtel and Den Networks. 
Tariff 
plan 
Al 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
A7 
A8 
A9 
10 
8 
6 
4 
P rice 
(Rs.) 
1899 
2199 
2499 
2099 
2399 
2999 
2399 
2699 
3299 
Airtel 
Speed h, l Data-cap 
(Mbps) (GB) 
16, 0.512 80 
16, 0.512 120 
16, 0.512 200 
24, 1 80 
24, 1 120 
24, 1 200 
40, 1 80 
40, 1 120 
40, 1 200 
Airtel --
Den Networks --········· 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
CPM (Rs) 
(a) 
Den Networks 
Tariff Price Speed h, l Data-cap 
plan (Rs.) (Mbps) (GB) 
Dl 700 5, 1 30 
D2 1000 5, 2 50 
D3 1250 5, 2 100 
D4 900 20, 1 30 
D5 1300 20, 2 50 
D6 1550 20, 2 100 
D7 1200 50, 1 30 
D8 1600 50, 2 50 
D9 2100 50, 2 100 
30 ~~~-~~~-~~~~ 
27 
24 
ai 2 1 
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(b) 
Figure 5.7: User incentives that Airtel and Den can offer: (a) speed and (b) data cap . 
CP M price is over 2 times higher than t he average market price, and the average on.line 
time is much higher than the present global average t ime. Similarly, it is economically 
infeasible to reach ad revenues equivalent to 75% of the CapEx. The shaded area in the 
graph represents economically viable settings where ad revenues cover 50% of Airtel's 
CapEx. Similarly, figure 5.5 shows t hat economically viable settings allow Den to earn 
ad revenues covering 5.6% of its CapEx. Figure 5.6 plots the percentage of the CapEx 
that ad revenues can cover with different ad frequencies. For Airtel, covering 100% of the 
CapEx requires displaying 2 ads per minute. For Den, the respective frequency is 18 ads 
per minute, which is clearly not viable. 
T he above analyses show that the ad-based revenue model can produce higher ad 
revenues and can be more economically viable for larger ISP s due to lower average costs 
per user. 
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Figure 5.8: Utility changes for providing extra speed as incentives by (a) Airtel and (b) 
Den. 
5.5.3 Incentives for user s 
By offsetting the ISP's expenses, the ad revenues enable the ISPs to offer attractive 
Internet access plans to the users and thereby increase its customer base. 
The incentives can be in the form of higher access speeds or larger data caps. To 
quantify these potential expenses, we obtain real ISP tariff prices. Table 5.5 presents the 
tariff prices of Airtel and Den for different speeds, throttled speeds, and data caps. Then, 
we compute the average incremental price of the speed by adding all the price differences 
between the tariffs with the same data caps and dividing this sum by the sum of all the 
corresponding speed differences. Similarly, we compute the average incremental price of 
the data cap by adding all the price differences between the tariffs with the same speeds 
and dividing this sum by the sum of data-cap differences. Table 5.5 shows that average 
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Figure 5.9: Utility changes for offering extra data as incentives by (a) Airtel and (b) Den. 
incremental price of the speed and the data cap are Rs. 22 per Mbps and Rs. 7 per GB 
respectively for Airtel, and Rs. 15 per Mbps and Rs. 12 per GB respectively for Den. 
Using the above incremental prices, we compute the speed and the data-cap incentives 
proportionally to the average ad revenue per user with ra defined in equality 5.1. Airtel 
can offer speed incentive 6h = ra/22 and data incentive 6dh = ra/7. Den can offer speed 
incentive 6h = ra/15 and data incentive 6dh = ra/12. Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b) present 
the potential speed and data-cap incentives respectively, as CPM changes for Airtel and 
Den. The economically viable speed with CPMavg is 6.3 Mbps and 9.3 Mbps for Airtel 
and Den respectively. The data-cap incentives for the same CPM price are 20 GB and 
12 GB for Airtel and Den respectively. Thus, while Den can offer stronger incentives for 
speeds than Airtel, Airtel can offer stronger incentives for data caps. 
Using equality 5.8, we analyze the impact of the incentives on the users' utility. The 
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utility changes are differences in the utility without and with the incentive. We compute
them for all the 9 tariff plans of Airtel and Den in table 5.5. Figure 5.8(a) presents
the relative utility changes for the speed as incentive of Airtel. The utility changes are
highest for low-speed tariffs A1, A2, and A3 gaining up to 32-34% at CPMavg. The
utility changes are the smallest for high-speed tariffs A7, A8, and A9 achieving 12-14%
gains at CPMavg. For the Airtel tariffs with same speed, the utility gain increases with
the increasing data cap. Figure 5.8(b) shows that Den can offer with CPMavg the highest
utility gains of 15–19% with tariffs D3, D6, D1, and D4 and the lowest gain of 3% with
tariff D2. Unlike Airtel, the utility changes for the Den’s tariff plans are not clustered
on the basis of speed. Because Den uses smaller data caps and larger throttled speeds
relative to the corresponding high-speed limits. As a result, the tariff plans with larger
throttled speeds or smaller data caps offer lower utility changes.
Figure 5.9(a) depicts data cap incentives that Airtel can offer. Here, the utility gains
are the highest for the tariffs with the smallest data caps across all the speed limits.
Though the utility gain increases with the increasing speed among the small data-cap
tariffs, the utility gain is sensitive to the throttled speeds of the tariffs. Therefore, the
highest gain of 20% at CPMavg is achieved by tariff A1 because of its smallest throttled
speed. Tariffs A4 and A7 with similar data caps and higher throttles speeds offer smaller
gains. The smallest gain at CPMavg is 8% with tariff A6. Figure 5.9(b) presents the
data-cap incentives for Den. At CPMavg, tariffs D1, D2, and D3 offer negligible utility
gains less than 1%. Tariff D7 offeres the highest gain of 24%.
The above analyses substantiate that the ad-based revenue model can enable large
access ISPs to offer significant incentives to the users. Though the ad revenue potential
is lower for small ISPs, the incentives can be tangible in their case as well.
5.6 Related Work
Many prior works on sponsoring ISPs costs pivot around partnerships between ISPs
and CSPs. [40] proposes a sponsorship agreement between ISPs and CSPs that discounts
the bandwidth costs incurred due to ads. Similarly, [41,42] analyzes the incentives derived
from partnerships between ISPs and CSPs as well as implications for the users, ISPs, and
CSPs. Charging of CSPs by ISPs to offset the costs of delivering content traffic is also the
focus of [111,20,121,122]. Our work differs from the previous works by considering a direct
business agreement between an ISP and advertisers without engaging the CSPs. Few ISPs
have employed online ads to subsidize the monthly subscription fee of the users [95,96]. In
these models, users are offered extra data caps in return for watching video ads. Our work,
though similar in spirit, distinguishes from such models by adopting a different technique
to display ads to users and we conduct extensive evaluations of ad-based model to analyze
the revenue potential and economic viability conditions for large and medium-sized access
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ISPs. Our evaluation reports significant benefits to the larger access ISPs.
5.7 Summary
While airports, shopping centers, and supermarkets offer ad-sponsored Internet access
to promote local businesses, this work evaluates an ad-based revenue model where an
access ISP earns ad revenues to offset its network expenses or to provide extra subscription
incentives to the users. Seeded by real financial data of 2 prominent access ISPs in India
and using real market-driven CPM prices of online ads, our analysis assesses the revenue
potential and economic viability of the ad-based revenue model. We analyzed potential
incentives in the form of speed, data-cap upgrades, and utility gains for the ad-subsidized
Internet subscribers.
Our work demonstrates that the large ISP with millions of subscribers has a significant
revenue potential up to 50% of its CapEx. The small ISP with tens of thousands of
subscribers can use ads to earn up to 5% of its CapEx. Our results indicate that the
ad-based revenue model might be economically viable for both large and small access
ISPs. The ad revenues can enable access ISPs to offer users incentives in the form of
extra 6–9 Mbps speed or 12–20 GB data cap. Our market survey shows that a significant
majority of residential users are willing to consider ad-subsidized Internet plans. Besides,
the ad-based model reduces concerns about net neutrality and also allows an access ISP
to earn ad revenues by displaying ads with an explicit consent of the user.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we analyze various approaches that ISPs can use for earning extra
revenues to economically sustain their network infrastructures. We begin our research by
exploring the economics of customer-traffic attraction by transit providers to boost their
transit revenues. This work reveals technical feasibility and significant revenue potential
of traffic attraction despite broad countermeasures by other ISPs. Then, we consider
hosting as an alternative way for transit ISPs to raise extra revenues. This measurement
work reveals content hosting to be pervasive across the Internet transit hierarchy. Finally,
we turn our attention to access ISPs that struggle to deal with their rising network costs
in the traditional flat-rate subscription model. We evaluate an alternative revenue model
where access ISPs earn ad revenues by displaying ads to the end users with their explicit
consent and also offer attractive incentives for subscribing to the ad-subsidized Internet
plan.
In our first work, presented in chapter 3, we examine how transit ISPs can attract
transit traffic to boost their transit revenues and whether other ISPs have effective coun-
termeasures against the traffic attraction. To deal with the vast size of the Internet
ecosystem and lack of comprehensive real data, we combine available real data and traffic
modeling to conduct realistic Internet-scale simulations of traffic attraction in our opti-
mized version of C-BGP. We start our study of customer-traffic attraction by simulating
the actual incident of YouTube’s prefix hijacking by Pakistan Telecom in 2008. Motivated
by the insights from this simulation, we conduct in-depth studies on various hypotheti-
cal scenarios of traffic attraction by means of prefix deaggregation by transit ASes from
different tiers of the transit hierarchy. The prefix deaggregation causes traffic to divert
to paths specified in announcements of deaggregated prefixes. We consider ASes from
the top 3 tiers of the transit hierarchy to act as traffic attractors. We also enable other
ASes to act against the traffic attraction through various mechanisms, such as filtering of
the deaggregated prefixes, disconnections from the traffic-attraction AS, and attempts of
losing ASes to counter-attract extra customer traffic to themselves.
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Our simulations demonstrate that traffic attraction and reactions to it redistribute
traffic on the inter-AS links and create camps of winning, losing and neutral ASes with
respect to their transit revenues. The evaluation reveals that tier-1 ASes have significant
financial incentives to attract traffic, with smaller benefits derived by tier-2 and tier-3
ASes. Despite various countermeasures by losing ASes, the traffic attraction via prefix
deaggregation remains effective unless ASes from the winning camp cooperate with the
losing ASes. Also, disconnections from the traffic-attracting AS does not completely
eliminate the gains from the traffic attraction, unless a large portion of the ASes, including
winners, terminate their business relationships with the attractor. Our sensitivity analysis
for the topology, traffic, and pricing shows qualitatively similar results, even though the
sensitivity to the traffic matrix is quantitatively smaller than to the topology and pricing.
Our analysis also demonstrates that the extra router-memory costs are not an effective
deterrent against traffic attraction.
This work strives to understand feasibility of earning extra transit revenues by
customer-traffic attraction in the presence of countermeasures by other ISPs. While
our work does not advocate, or oppose, prefix deaggregation for the traffic attraction, the
results demonstrate significant financial benefits for traffic-attraction by transit providers.
Our second work presented in chapter 4 explores hosting of online contents as an alter-
native source of revenues for transit providers. To explore the global hosting ecosystem,
we employ a novel VPN-based measurement approach to collect real online contents from
top 2,165 websites in 52 countries. Then, we use a network of 22,000 open recursive DNS
servers in 172 countries and 8,500 ASes to discover ASes and CDNs hosting the online
contents of the 2,165 websites. Since online ads are the primary source of revenues in the
online content sector, we classify online contents as ads and regular contents and analyze
qualitative and quantitative differences in hosting of the two types of contents.
Our Internet-scale measurements discover a vast ecosystem of CDNs and ASes hosting
online contents across the transit hierarchy and geography. The pervasive and significant
hosting of online contents by transit networks raises a need for new models where the
content traffic matrix includes transit ASes as sources of content traffic. Our work reveals
that online contents are most commonly hosted at intermediate and edge layers, with
smaller presence at the core of the transit hierarchy. Though the aggregate fraction
of contents hosted at the core is smaller than at the intermediate and edge layers, the
content densities in bytes per AS are the highest for the core ASes. We identify several
AS clusters with different numbers of ASes and similar content-hosting characteristics.
While ad contents are distributed across many smaller AS clusters, the regular contents
are distributed across few bigger AS clusters. Hence, the replication is global for regular
contents and local for ads. Compared to the regular contents, ad contents employ a
higher number of IP addresses and ASes per website, suggesting that ads are hosted by
a higher number of servers to distribute load broadly. Ads and regular contents also
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differ substantially in their delivery performance. While responses to individual content
requests are quicker for ads, the download time is lower for regular contents of a webpage.
While ad revenues help CSPs to produce more advanced bandwidth-intensive contents,
access ISPs face rising costs to deliver the bandwidth-intensive contents. Besides, access
ISPs struggle to earn sufficient revenues in the traditional flat-rate subscription model.
While many access ISPs experiment with alternative pricing of end-user subscriptions,
few large access ISPs demand content-based payments from CSPs or transit providers,
triggering concerns about net neutrality and inter-ISP relation disputes.
In our third work presented in chapter 5, we evaluate an alternative economic model
where access ISPs earn ad revenues by directly collaborating with advertisers and ad
networks to display ads to end users. We assess the revenue potential and economic
viability of the model for access ISPs. We also analyze incentives that access ISPs can
offer ad-subsidized Internet subscribers. We evaluate our model using real financial data
from 2 prominent access ISPs in India and real CPM ad prices from a popular Indian
entertainment website. Our analysis demonstrates a tangible revenue potential for access
ISPs up to 50% of CapEx for a large access ISP and up to 5% of CapEx for a medium-
sized access ISP. If the access ISPs decide to use ad revenues for providing incentives to
users, the ad revenues can support incentive up to 6–9 Mbps extra speed or 12–20 GB
extra data cap. Lastly, our market survey of Indian retail customers shows their interest
in trying an ad-subsidized access plan. While the model relies on direct collaboration of
ISPs with advertisers without engaging CSPs, this model faces lesser concerns about net
neutrality.
To reflect on the thesis as a whole, we can make the following generalizing obser-
vations. The ISPs’ quest for finding alternative revenue sources increases diversity and
inter-dependence of service providers in the transit, content, hosting, and access sectors.
While service providers compete for higher profits, they also cooperate with each other
to realize their individual objectives. The evaluation of traffic attraction demonstrates
competition and cooperation among transit ISPs to attract traffic and defend against the
attraction respectively. Besides, our findings shed light on understanding how vulnerable
the inter-domain routing is to unorthodox announcements. Employing measurements,
we demonstrate pervasive economic cooperation between CSPs and transit ISPs to host
online contents. While such collaboration improves content delivery performance, it also
fuels tussles of access ISPs with transit ISPs and CSPs. Several business models proposed
to address such tussles, the proposals do not resolve all concerns, e.g., about net neutral-
ity. We evaluate an ad-based revenue model with a proven track record in the content
sector and demonstrate its tangible potential to be successfully leveraged by access ISPs.
By exploring different revenue sources for ISPs, this thesis paves way for future works
on economic, technical, and security aspects in the Internet economic ecosystem. In the
following, we briefly present our envisioned future goals stemming from this thesis.
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While our traffic-attraction work extensively evaluates reactions of losing ISPs via
technical means, this work does not evaluate legal repercussions. Whereas prefix deag-
gregation does not violate any law and is routinely used for traffic engineering, the traffic
attraction via prefix deaggregation might face future legal challenges. This can be an
interesting direction for future work on traffic attraction by transit providers. While
several security proposals to detect deaggregation-based traffic attraction exist, none of
them currently prevents traffic attraction that relies on a different technique, such as path
shortening or origin AS spoofing. We envision a future security work to prevent traffic
attraction regardless of the underlying attraction technique. Next, our work on exploring
the content hosting provides only a single snapshot of the content-hosting ecosystem. To
measure the evolution of the hosting ecosystem, we envision future work developing a fully
automated tool to characterize hosting of online contents at weekly, monthly, and yearly
granularities. Leveraging machine-learning methodologies, we also envision to use the real
temporal data from the latter future work to develop security solutions that anticipate
and prevent traffic attraction. Next, the ad-based model discussed in this thesis relies on
a browser plugin to periodically fetch ads. Therefore, we plan to develop such browser
plugin for ad-subsidized Internet access that preserves security and privacy of the users.
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